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ABSTRACT
Essays in Macroeconomics of Debt Deleveraging
Federica Romei
This dissertation analyzes, in two chapters, how monetary and fiscal authorities can
optimally manage debt reduction episodes.
In the first chapter I show how public debt deleveraging leads to a recession with dif-
ferent effects on real interest rates according to the fiscal instruments the government
is using to reduce the debt. The fiscal authority should not depress much consump-
tion of the agents who hold savings to improve the welfare of the ones who do not
have access to financial markets. Moreover speed and timing of public deleveraging
depend crucially on the type of instrument the fiscal authority uses to enforce it.
Nominal rigidities, in this context, seem to be beneficial for the agents who cannot
insure themselves through financial markets.
In the second chapter, written together with Prof. Pierpaolo Benigno, we show how
deleveraging from high debt can provoke deep recession with significant international
side effects. Due the debt reduction process, real and nominal variables can be sub-
ject to high fluctuations. All these movements are inefficient and interesting trade-offs
emerge from the perspective of global welfare. Counterintuitively, we show that the
optimal adjustment to global imbalances should not necessarily require large move-
ments in the nominal exchange rate. Moreover we show that, whenever countries have
an high degree of openness to trade, Central Banks needs to create a global liquidity
trap to face the deleveraging shock.
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Introduction
This dissertation analyzes, in two chapters, how monetary and fiscal authorities can
optimally manage debt reduction episodes. The first chapter studies what is the
optimal public deleveraging speed for a fiscal authority in a closed economy context.
The second chapter, written with Prof. Pierpaolo Benigno, instead, considers how a
Central Bank should optimally react to an international private deleveraging episode.
More in detail, in the first chapter I study, in a context of heterogenous agents,
incomplete markets and closed economy, what is the optimal deleveraging path that
a fiscal authority needs to undertake when forced to reduce public debt. I consider a
public deleveraging that may occur either through a public expenditure reduction or
through an income taxation increase. I analyze, then, what are the consequences, on
agents’ welfare, of different speeds of deleveraging and different fiscal instruments. I
focus, moreover, part of my analysis on how nominal rigidities interact with public
deleveraging.
I find that under taxation experiment real interest rates tend to be very high and
this is helpful for the class of agents who holds savings. When, instead, government
uses public expenditure to reduce debt, real interest rates are below the steady state:
This situation may be beneficial, if economy do not enter a liquidity trap, for the
agents who do not participate in financial markets. I also find that, in most cases,
agents who do not have access to the financial markets benefit from the presence of
downward wages rigidities.
In the second chapter, we study a Central Bank who faces an international private
debt deleveraging episode in a context of a two-country economy. We model a country,
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H, as a net borrower and the other country, F , as a net saver and we shock the
economy raising the cost of borrowing. Finally we assume the presence of a unique
Central Bank (or equivalently two cooperative Central Banks) that maximizes the
welfare of economy as a whole. The question we address is how the Central Bank can
manage optimally this deleveraging episode.
We find that there are three channels through which the global economy can absorb
the private deleveraging costs. The first is the reduction of the real interest rate of
country H, the one who reduces his debt. The second is the expenditure-switching
channel, namely a depreciation of the currency of country H in order to steal part
of global demand. Unfortunately, movements in the nominal exchange rate lead to
inefficient movements in the terms of trade, increasing the economy’s welfare costs.
The third mechanism that the Central Bank can use is the reduction of the nominal
interest rate of the country F who is a net saver. According to the degree of home
bias and the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in country H and F ,
Central Bank mixes the three channels to react optimally to the deleveraging shock.
To summarize, I focus first on a domestic episode of public debt reduction and then
on an international episode of private debt reduction. In both experiments I find that
choices of Fiscal and Monetary authority have non negligible consequences on agents’
welfare. Understanding how to deal with a debt deleveraging, then, carries important
policy implications.
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CHAPTER 1
Need for the Right Speed:
Public Debt Deleveraging and the Timing of
Austerity
1.1. Introduction
Many countries have experienced in recent years a significant increase in the size of
their public debt. While in some countries public debt increased largely as a conse-
quence of the financial crisis, notably in the United States, in others, debt was already
significantly high at the onset of the crisis. As some Eurozone economies struggled
to refinance their debt, those who received assistance packages from institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund or the European Central Bank were asked to
implement plans to reduce their stock of liabilities. Even economies that did not
receive assistance are now facing the question of how to deleverage. Remarkably, this
episode of public debt deleveraging is set to occur after an unprecedented recession,
whose effects have been felt differently according to agents’ position in the wealth
distribution.
This chapter studies the optimal deleveraging path a fiscal authority should undertake
when forced to reduce public debt in a context of heterogenous agents and incomplete
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markets.
In my model, the government can use public expenditure or distortionary income
taxation to deleverage. Agents differ with respect to their possibility of accessing
financial markets: Only a subset of consumers can borrow or lend to smooth their
consumption. In this context, public sector deleveraging has strong redistributional
effects. Indeed, a large public debt implies high taxes (or low public expenditure) for
all agents, while interest payments only accrue to those holding public bonds. High
government debt is then a net transfer of wealth from the consumers who cannot
trade financial assets to the ones who can. The timing of deleveraging and the fiscal
instrument chosen to perform it are therefore not inconsequential in this context.
The choice of instrument through which the fiscal authority will reduce debt is impor-
tant to determine dynamics of aggregate variables and agents’ welfare. A reduction
in public expenditure or an increase in distortionary taxation will lead to different
types of recessions, with different effects on interest rates. In the first case, the real
interest rate prevailing in the economy will fall. The government and agents who do
not participate in financial markets will gain from low real interest rates. When the
fiscal authority uses taxes to reduce the debt, instead, interest rates rise significantly.
Consumers who hold public bonds will be the ones to benefit from this situation.
The presence of nominal rigidities and the Zero Lower Bound interact asymmetrically
with the different types of recessions considered. Also, their effects on redistribution
are non-trivial. When deleveraging occurs through a reduction in public expenditure
a liquidity trap may occur, while downward wage rigidities are helpful for agents who
have no access to financial markets. When, instead, deleveraging is brought about
via taxation, presence of this kind of rigidities exerts an upward pressure on the real
interest rate, worsening welfare of the economy as a whole.
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1.2. Literature Reviews
My research is closely related to two different strands of the literature: one that has
focused on private debt deleveraging and its interaction with monetary policy, and
another one on optimal fiscal policy under commitment.
Papers in the literature on private debt deleveraging typically model such an event as
an exogenous shock then analyzing the impact of different monetary policies in this
context. Some recent papers, such as Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2010), Krugman and
Eggertsson (2012) or Philippon and Midrigan (2011) have studied debt deleveraging in
a closed economy. Others, among which Fornaro (2012) Cook and Devereux (2012)
and Benigno and Romei (2012), have focused on the consequences of private debt
deleveraging in an international context. I depart from this literature in two way: I
analyze a public debt deleveraging and I study how the deleveraging path impacts on
agents welfare.
A second strand of literature analyzes optimal fiscal policy. In their seminal paper,
Lucas and Stokey (1983) show how the public authority should react to a shock when
it is possible to issue a state contingent debt, in a representative consumer frame-
work. One of the main results is that the public instrument inherits the persistence
of the shock. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent and Seppala (2002) analyze the same prob-
lem when the public authority cannot issue state contingent debt. They show that,
under this circumstance, the public authority instrument is more persistent than the
shock. Werning (2007) and Karantounias (2013) analyze the same problem, the for-
mer departing from the representative agent assumption, while the latter considering
recursive preferences. Lastly Bandhari, Evans, Golosov and Sargent (2013) study op-
timal taxation with heterogenous agents and aggregate uncertainty. This literature
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aims to understand how a government can react optimally to a shock. This chapter,
instead, aims to understand, what is the optimal government-induced shock on the
economy.
My paper is close to the work of Ro¨hrs and Winter (2014). They analyze what
are the consequences of a public debt reduction under heterogenous agents, market
incompleteness under flexible prices on aggregate welfare . My research differ in that I
focus on the optimal deleveraging speed and on its interaction with nominal rigidities.
1.3. Model
1.3.1. Consumers
I consider a closed economy inhabited by two types of agents, that I call Savers and
Hand-to-Mouth. There is a continuum of measure 1 − χ of Savers and a continuum
of measure χ of Hand-to-Mouth. There is no uncertainty, so all agents have perfect
foresight. Following Weil (1992), Savers differ with respect to the type of financial
markets they can have access to. Hand-to-Mouth are endowed at birth with one
unity of equity in all the firms in the economy. They cannot hold any other type of
financial assets. Savers, instead, are not only endowed with the same amount of equity
in firms that borrowers have, but they are also able to trade in riskless, one-period,
non-contingent bonds. Access to financial markets allows Savers to choose how to
optimally allocate their consumption intertemporally. Hand-to-Mouth agents, on the
other hand, are forced to solve a static problem in each period.
Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2000), among others, show that the degree of participa-
tion in financial markets increases in wealth. Accordingly, I consider Hand-to-Mouth
agents in this model to proxy for the lower quantiles of the wealth distribution in the
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economy. Savers, on the other hand, proxy for richer consumers who hold financial
assets in their portfolio.
Savers and Hand-to-Mouth have identical preferences over streams of consumpion, C
and government-provided services, G. Moreover, they enjoy leisure and they supply
hours of labor l to firms in the economy. Agents’ lifetime utility is:
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cjt , Gt, l
j
t ) for j = {H,S} (1.1)
where U(.) is concave, twice differentiable and satisfies the Inada condition.
I assume that C and G are bundles of goods
C =
[∫ 1
0
c(i)
−1
 di
] 
−1
and
G =
[∫ 1
0
g(i)
−1
 di
] 
−1
,
where c(i) and g(i) are private and public consumption of a generic good i produced
in the economy. I assume the presence of a continuum of measure one of goods, which
are imperfect substitute with an elasticity of intratemporal substitution equal to  in
both aggregators.
Savers and Hand-to-Mouth to firms two different varieties of labor. Every agent
supplies labor to all the firms. Total labor supply of each agent is then:
lH =
∫ 1
0
lH(i)di lS =
∫ 1
0
lS(i)di
where lH(i) (lS(i)) is the amount of hours supplied to firm i by the agent of type H
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(S). Since agents are indiffernt across firms to which they supply labor, an agent of
type H (S) will receive the same wage WH (WS) from all firms.
Savers trade one-period riskless bond, bst in unit of consumption good that pays a real
interest rate, rt. Hand-to-Mouth, instead, consume profits distributed by firms and
their labor income in each period. Their respective budget constraints are as follows:
CSt = WS,tlS,t(1− τt)− bSt +
bSt+1
1 + rt
+$t (1.2)
and
CHt = WH,tlH,t(1− τt) +$t (1.3)
where $ are profits paid by each firm and τt is a proportional income tax charged by
the fiscal authority.
Real interest rate is determined by the Fisher equation:
(1 + rt) =
(1 + it)
Πt+1
where it is the nominal interest rate at time t and Πt+1 is the gross inflation at time
t+1. Since the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, the real rate must be greater
than the inverse of inflation, i.e.:
(1 + rt) ≥ 1
Πt+1
(1.4)
Hand-to-Mouth do not face any intertemporal decision problem. In every period they
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decide consumption and labor supply, according to the first order condition:
Ul(c
H
t , Gt, lH,t)
Uc(cHt , Gt, lH,t)
= −WH,t(1− τt) (1.5)
Savers, on the other hand, decide how much to save as well as consumption and hours
supplied, maximizing (1.1) subject to (1.2):
Uc(c
S
t , Gt, lS,t) = β(1 + rt)Uc(c
S
t+t, Gt+1, lS,t+1) (1.6)
Ul(c
S
t , Gt, lS,t)
Uc(cSt , Gt, lS,t)
= −WS,t(1− τt) (1.7)
Savers smooth consumption intertemporally according to their Euler equation. Note
that since Savers are the only type of agent that can optimally allocate their in-
tertemporal pattern of consumption, their behavior will critically affect the price of
the bond and the interest rate.
1.3.2. Firms
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical firms of measure one. Each
firm has access to the following technology
y(i) = L(i)ω = (LS(i)
αSLH(i)
αH )ω (1.8)
allowing them to transform a mix of two different types of labor inputs, LS and LH
into output of a differentiated good.
Total labor hired by each firm is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator of labor supplied by
each type of agent, with αS + αH = 1 and αS > αH to capture positive correlation
between the distribution of wealth and the distribution of skills in the economy. Firms
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opereate under decreasing return to scale, so that ω < 1.
Every firm
min
LS(i),LH(i)
WSLS(i) +WHLH(i) (1.9)
subject to
y(i) ≤ y¯
From the optimization problem above, I derive
WSLS(i)
αS
=
WHLH(i)
αH
= WL(i)
where the aggregate real wage W is defined as:
W = (kWαSS W
αH
H )
where k ≡
(
1
αS
)αS (
1
αH
)αH
.
Each firm i, competing under monopolistic competition, faces a demand schedule of
the type:
y(i) =
(
p(i)
P
)−
[C +G] =
(
p(i)
P
)−
Y (1.10)
where p(i) is the price set by firm i and P is the price aggregator defined as:
P =
(∫ 1
0
p(i)1−di
) 1
1−
Every firm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting nominal prices a-la Rotemberg which
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is measured in units of aggregate final output, i.e.:
φ(pt(i), pt−1(i), Yt) =
φ
2
(
pt(i)
pt−1(i)Π¯
− 1
)2
Yt.
where Π¯ is steady state inflation and φ > 0 determines the degree of nominal rigidity.
Firms maximize the present discounted sum of their profits:
$(i)t =
∞∑
t=0
βtλt
[
pt(i)
Pt
yt(i)−Wt(i)Lt(i)− φ(pt(i), pt−1(i), Yt)
]
(1.11)
subject to (1.8) and (1.10), where λt ≡ (χUc(cHt , Gt, lHt ) + (1 − χ)Uc(cSt , Gt, lSt )) is a
weighted average of agents’ specific stochastic discount factors. I can exploit the fact
that every firm faces the same cost as well as the same demand schedule to drop the
i index. First order condition for profits is as follows:
Wt =
ω
µ
Y
1− 1
ω
t +
φω

(Πt − Π¯)ΠtY 1−
1
ω
t − β
λt+1
λt
φω

(Πt+1 − Π¯)Πt+1Yt+1Y −
1
ω
t (1.12)
where µ ≡ 
−1 is the markup and Πt ≡ PtPt−1 is the gross inflation rate. Output ,
Yt, increases if either aggregate real costs decrease, Wt, if current inflation increases
or if future inflation will decrease. From this equation it is possible to derive the
standard positively sloped AS curve, since firms will supply more output whenever
prices increase.
Additionally, firms are subject to a second type of rigidity: nominal wages are down-
wardly rigid for both types of labor. A generic firm i is a wage taker and does not
consider this rigidity when maximizing their profits. Similarly, workers supply labor
in a perfect competitive market and, as a consequence they also do not take into
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account the presence of this rigidity.
This friction is expressed as follows:
WS,t ≥ ψWS,t−1Πt WH,t ≥ ψWH,t−1Πt (1.13)
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of wage rigidity: ψ = 0 means that wages are free
to move, while ψ = 1 leads to completely rigid nominal wage. I assume that the
parameter ψ is identical for both labor markets.
Labor markets, whenever condition (1.13) is binding, will determine hours worked by
the demand side, only. This will generate some involuntary unemployment due to
high cost in that labor market. To summarize, when wages are free to move labor
markets will clear, otherwise there will be an excessive supply of labor hours.
(LH,t − χlH,t) (WH,t − ψWH,t−1Πt) = 0 (1.14)
and
(LS,t − (1− χ)lS,t) (WS,t − ψWS,t−1Πt) = 0 (1.15)
Notice that the economy can be in four different situations: either Savers’ labor
market or Hand-to-Mouth labor market or both or none can experience involuntary
unemployment. The introduction of two different labor markets allows me to consider
the redistributional effect of downward wage rigidities in this context.
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1.3.3. Government and Central Bank
The government provides Gt units of non-rival consumption good in every period.
Public expenditure is financed either by charging taxes on labor income or by issuing
a bond in term of consumption good, BGt whose return, also denominated in units of
consumption good, is the real interest rate, rt. Government budget constraint is :
τt(W
S
t l
S
t +W
H
t l
H
t ) = Gt +
BGt+1
(1 + rt)
−BGt (1.16)
Since a fraction of the population is not able to optimally smooth consumption, the
fiscal authority, by borrowing and saving, can positively affect the welfare of such
agents.
The objective of the Central Bank is to maintain inflation on target whenever possi-
ble. The Central Bank keeps the nominal interest rate at zero whenever the desired
nominal interest is negative.

Πt = Π¯ if it ≥ 0
it = 0 Otherwise
(1.17)
1.3.4. Market Clearing Condition
Goods and financial markets clear, i.e.:
(1− χ)CSt + χCHt +Gt = Yt (1.18)
BGt + (1− χ)bSt = 0 (1.19)
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Labor markets clear only if the constraint (1.13) is not binding. Hence:
(LH,t − χlH,t) (WH,t − ψWH,t−1Πt) = 0
and
(LS,t − (1− χ)lS,t) (WS,t − ψWS,t−1Πt) = 0
1.3.5. Equilibrium
Given a sequence of taxes, public expenditure and nominal interest rates {τt, Gt}∞t=0
an equilibrium is a sequence of prices {rt,Πt,Wt,W St ,WHt }∞t=0 and allocations,
{CSt , CHt , LSt , LHt , lSt , lHt , bst , Yt} such that:
• Given prices, Savers maximize (1.1) subject to (1.2) and Hand-to-Mouth maxi-
mize (1.1) subject to (1.3) ;
• Every firm maximizes (1.11) subject to (1.8) and (1.10) ;
• Goods, financial and labor markets clear, (1.18), (1.18), (1.14) and (1.15);
• Government Budget Constraint is satisfied, (1.16);
• Central Bank targets the inflation, (1.17);
1.4. Calibration
1.4.1. Quantitative Results
This section analyzes the effects of a public debt reduction on agents’ welfare. The
assumption made in this model that the economy is populated by two types of agents
helps to capture unequal responses to fiscal shocks, shown to be important by Kan-
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ishka and Surico (2011), among others. These authors, highlight, in particular, that
a variable determining different effects of fiscal changes is tightness of borrowing con-
straints, captured in this paper by the inability to borrow of Hand-to-Mouth agents.
I consider a scenario under which that the fiscal authority is forced to bring down its
debt from an high level, BH , to a low one, BL in a determined time span. Such a
debt reduction can be rationalized in several ways. For example, this path may be
imposed by the existence of a supranational authority or by international investors
willing to charge an infinite cost to the economy if at time T debt is not at the target,
BL.
Note that infinte paths are available to the fiscal authority to converge to the new
steady state. I restrict my analysis to the class of monotonic decreasing deleveraging
paths. This seems consistent with casual empirical evidence: as Southern European
economies implemented austerity measures in response to the recent sovereign debt
crisis, the proposed plans for public borrowing generally implied a mononotonically
decreasing path for public debt.
I model the path of deleveraging as:
BGt = B
H
t + (B
L
t −BHt )
(
t
T
)JB
where I assume a strictly positive JB. Figure 1 show that JB is a measure of the
speed of the public deleverage. A JB < 1 determines a convex deleveraging path
(fast) while with a JB > 1 deleveraging is a concave process (slow).
Throughout the exercise, I remain agnostic about aggregate the welfare measure in
this economy. I will proceed by analyzing separately the impact of different policies
on the Hand-to-Mouth and Savers’ welfare. This allows me to avoid imposition of
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Pareto weights on the heterogeneous agents that populate this economy.
The following proposition shows how, under certain conditions on agents’ value func-
tions, studying individual consumers’ welfare allows us to exclude a given set of Pareto
dominated policies. This will allow us, on the other hand, to state that the optimal
policy for the economy as a whole will belong to the complement of this set.
I define the welfare function as:
We(JB) =
∞∑
t=0
βt {aWeH(JB) + (1− a)WeS(JB)}
where WeH(JB) and WeS(JB) are the Hand-to-Mouth and Savers value function,
respectively, as a function of JB and a is a generic weight that can take any value in
the interval [0, 1]. I define JBH and JBS, respectively as
JBk = arg maxJBWek(JB) k = {S,H}.
Moreover, I define JBW as:
JBW = arg maxJBWe(JB)
Proposition 1 If agents’ value functions are continuous, twice differentiable and
concave in JB, with JBS < JBH (JBH < JBS), then the JBW that maximize W
for a generic a ∈ [0, 1] will lie in the interval [JBS, JBH ] ([JBH , JBS]). All the JB
who do not belong to this interval are Pareto dominated.
Proof is in appendix A.
I will restrict the set of possible actions undertaken by the government to reduce debt
14
to include either reductions in government expenditure or increases in tax rates, but
not both. Obviously, fiscal authorities in the real world may adopt a combination of
these. However, this restriction allows to consider separately the effects of different
types of fiscal contractions.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
Quarters
D
eb
t
o
n
G
D
P
%
JB=0.2
JB=1
JB=2.5
Figure 1: Figure shows different deleveraging path according to different JB. A JB < 1
(blue continuos line) represents a convex (fast) deleverage, a JB = 1 (red dotted
line) stands for a smooth deleverage while a JB > 1 (green line) represents a
concave (slow) deleverage.
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1.4.2. Calibration
The model is calibrated quarterly. I use a global method to take into account non
linearities that may arise from the Zero Lower Bound and downward nominal wage
rigidities. Preferences take the following functional form:
U(cj, G, lj) =
(cj ψG1−ψ)1−ρ
1− ρ −
lj (1+η)
(1 + η)
for j = {S,H}
where I set ψ = .9 and ρ = η = 2 in line with the literature1. I assume that 80%
of consumers are Savers - χ = .2. I set αS equal to 0.8 such that individual labor
income is identical for the Savers and for t Hand-to-Mouth2. I set ω, the parameter
governing decreasing return to scale to equal 0.9.
I set real rate in line with literature at 2.5% and the steady state gross inflation equal
to 1. I assume that the elasticity of substitution among the different varieties, , is
equal to 8 such that the markup is 1.14.
I set tax in initial and final steady state to match the median payroll tax in US,
τ = .127 . In 2013 US debt to GDP held by the public but not by the Federal
Reserve System equalled 55%. More than half was held by foreign investors. Hence,
I set the debt to GDP at yearly basis at 27.5% and I decrease this to 25% during the
exercise.
In all the exercises, I set public expenditure as a share of GDP, sg, to equal .931 in the
initial steady state and equal to .938 in the final steady state. When debt reduction
occurs through income tax I move in the first quarter sg from .931 to .938. The time
span of deleveraging, T , is equal to 4 quarters.
1De Walque, Smets and Wouters (2005)
2From firms’ cost minimization (1−χ)αS W
SlS = χαHW
H lH .
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Parameters Flexible Prices Rotemberg Costs (RC) RC and Wage Rigidities
η 2 2 2
ρ 2 2 2
χ .2 .2 .2
αS .8 .8 .8
ω .9 .9 .9
 8 8 8
τ .127 .127 .127
DinitialGDP .275 .275 .275
DfinalGDP .25 .25 .25
sinitialg .931 .931 .931
sfinalg .938 .938 .938
φ 0 77 77
ψ 0 0 .97
Table 1: This table shows parameters values used for calibration under different the exer-
cises of the chapter/paper.
1.5. Benchmark
In this section I assume that φ = ψ = 0, so that prices are perfectly flexible, and
that the nominal interest rate can go below zero, so that the constraint (1.17) does
not hold. This formulation is helpful to understand the main mechanism behind the
model and it will be the benchmark for all other exercises.
1.5.1. Public Expenditure
In this section I will consider the effects of of a reduction in public debt that is
achieved by reducing public expenditure. The fiscal authority will create a shock
on the demand side that will lead, independently on the speed of the deleverage,
to an output recession. Savers, during the transition, are forced to consume more,
as government is cutting back debt. Consequently, the real interest rate falls when
deleveraging occurs. This is a key result since the government as well as Hand-to-
Mouth consumers will benefit from a low rate.
17
It is important to note that, the less gradual the process of debt reduction, the
more sizable will be the drop in the real rate. As a result, Hand-to-Mouth prefer
a debt reduction that occurs in as few quarters as possible. Moreover, they would
like deleverage to take place as soon as possible. The explanation is straightforward:
assume that most of the debt reduction occurs in the last quarter. Knowing this,
Savers will be willing to move resources from the future to the present. This will
put an upward pressure on the real rate before deleveraging has been undertaken.
The government would then pay a high interest rate on a large stock of debt. As
a consequence, Hand-to-Mouth consumers dislike such a deleveraging path and they
would prefer the debt reduction to occur as soon as possible.
As shown in Figure 2 , under this public expenditure experiment, Hand-to-Mouth
prefer an extremely fast deleverage. The fiscal authority severely reduces public ex-
penditure in the first quarter. Output collapses since firms face a drop in demand.
Savers, being forced to save less, experience a boom consumption. The real rate de-
creases, reducing financing costs for the government. Note that, despite the aggressive
policy stance, debt to GDP do not fall immediately due to the recession.
Movements in the real rate will also drive Savers’ choice of optimal deleveraging path.
Since they want to avoid an extreme drop in the real interst rate, they prefer, as
Figure 2 shows, a relatively slow and smooth reduction of debt. Savers, knowing that
they will experience a consumption boom in the last quarters, are willing to dissave in
the first quarters. The real rate falls in the last quarter but, in the preceding periods,
it will be relatively high. The economy will experience a prolonged output recession,
mostly due to the fall in Hand-to-Mouth consumption and government expenditure.
Debt to GDP will converge slowly to the new steady state.
Note that in both cases, in general equilibrium, a big fall in the real interest rate
18
prevents large fluctuations in real variables.
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Figure 2: Figure show the optimal i.r.f. for the Hand-to-Mouth consumers (red dotted line)
and for the Savers (blue continuos line) when fiscal authority reduces his debt
using public expenditure. Real rate, r, and debt on GDP, Bgdp are in percentage
levels, while the other variables are in percentage deviations from the final steady
state.
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1.5.2. Taxation
I consider now an experiment in which the fiscal authority raises income tax to finance
reduction in debt.
As before, independently on the speed of deleverage, the economy will experience
an output recession. Differently from before, however, the negative demand shock,
will be only indirectly created by the government. Agents, facing high distortionary
taxes, are poorer. As they consume less, output is depressed.
On the other hand, during the debt reduction, the real interest rate will now increase.
Savers, indeed, face a reduction in their after-tax labor income. Having access to the
financial market, they are then willing to borrow, putting upward pressure on the
real rate. The government then has to deleverage when financing costs are high.
Tax pressure on the agents needs to increase further to finance the debt reduction.
Consumption falls by more, further increasing the pressure on real rate. The economy
enters a vicious circle of deep output recession and high interest rate.
Note that, despite the fall in own private consumption and public expenditure, Savers
gain during the transition, independently on the deleveraging speed. Their financial
income increases, allowing them to enjoy more leisure when their wage is lowered by
distortionary taxation.
Differently from the previous experiment, it is Savers who want to affect the interest
rate the most, as this increases during the transition. Hence, they will prefer a very
fast deleveraging. As Figure 3 shows, in their preferred path, the fiscal authority
performs the whole debt reduction in the first quarter causing a deep, but short,
recession. Debt to GDP will initially increase.
20
Hand-to-Mouth, under this experiment would prefer instead a slow debt reduction,
as they want to reduce upward pressure on the real rate. As shown by Figure 3,
the economy enters a long output recession. The real rate is close to the steady
state, spiking in the last quarter. Compared to the previous case, Hand-to-Mouth
consumption decreases by more, while labor supply increases due to the high real
interest rate.
Under this experiment, again, debt to GDP initially increases due to the endogenous
recession.
21
0 1 2 3 4 5
−2
0
2
C S
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
−20
0
20
CH
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
−10
0
10
lS
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
5
lH
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
−5
0
5
Y
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
10
20
r
%
0 1 2 3 4 5
20
25
30
BGDP
%
Quarters
 
 
S
Htm
0 1 2 3 4 5
10
20
30
τ
%
Quarters
Figure 3: Figure show the optimal i.r.f. for the Hand-to-Mouth consumers (red dotted line)
and for the Savers (blue continuos line) when fiscal authority reduces his debt
using tax on labor. Real rate, r, debt on GDP, BGDP and tax share, τ are in
percentage levels, while the other variables are in percentage deviations from the
final steady state.
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1.5.3. Consumption Equivalent
In order to compare welfare under the two fiscal experiments I compute the consump-
tion equivalent, ce as:
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cjt , Gt, l
j
t ) =
U(Cj − cje, Gj, lj)
1− β j = {S,H}
where the right hand side is utility for consumer j computed along the simulations and
Cj, G and lj are consumption, public expenditure and labor, respectively, computed
at the final steady state for consumer of type j. Following Lucas (1987), I define con-
sumption equivalent as the decrease in steady-state consumption that makes agents
indifferent between a constant consumption path and the time-varying one achieved
in the simulation. Under this definition, a positive consumption equivalent amounts
to a welfare cost while a negative consumption equivalent amounts to a welfare gain.
In Figure 4 I plot consumption equivalent as a percentage share of final steady state
consumption for Hand-to-Mouth (first panel) and Savers (second panel) as a function
of the speed of deleveraging, JB. Solid line refers to deleveraging achieved via a
reduction in public expenditure, while the solid line refers to the increase in taxes
experiment. 3
In this flexible price setup, Hand-to-Mouth lose during the debt reduction, indepen-
dently of the speed of deleveraging. On the other hand, Savers may gain or lose
depending on the speed. The Figure shows how some deleveraging paths are Pareto
dominated by others: for example, under tax experiment for which JB > 1.75, where
1.75 is the minimum consumption equivalent achievable by the Hand-to-Mouth, wel-
3Note that the consumption equivalent is a continuos and convex function in the debt reduction
speed JB. It follows that agents’ value functions are continuos and concave in JB. The assumptions
of Proposition 1 are then satisfied.
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fare of both agents would improve by choosing a lower JB .
Limiting the analysis to the interval of debt reduction speeds JB that are not Pareto
dominated, Hand-to-Mouth lose less, in term of welfare, from a deleveraging achieved
by a fall in public expenditure than from one achieved by an increase in taxes. The
main difference between the two experiments is in the behavior of the real interest
rate. Hand-to-Mouth, once they internalize the government budget constraint, are
net borrowers. As a consequence, they dislike high real interest rates. Moreover,
under the tax experiment, the economy enters a deeper recession than under the
public expenditure case. Hand-to-Mouth agents, having no access to the financial
market, will be more exposed to the cost of the recession.
On the other hand, Savers have strong preferences for deleveraging via taxation.
Indeed, oppositely than Hand-to-Mouth, they hold public bonds, thus benefitting
from high real interest rates.
Recently, in Southern European countries, there has been a large debate on how to
implement austerity measures. One of the positions suggests to heavily tax savers, in
order to achieve a more equal distribution. In light of this model, under flexible prices,
this is detrimental for agents who have no access to financial markets. This result
crucially depends on general equilibrium effects: Abstracting from debt reduction,
let us consider the effects of policies that aim to subsidize Hand-to-Mouth agents
by taxing the wealthy. Savers will work less in response, consuming their financial
wealth instead. The real interest rate increases and output falls. A government who
is a borrower will pay a high interest rate on his debt while tax revenues increase
less due to the output recession. It is likely that, due to the recession and to the real
interest rate rise, the government will have a hard time in achieving its objective.
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Figure 4: Figure shows consumption equivalent as a percentage of final steady state con-
sumption for Hand-to-Mouth (first panel) and Savers (second panel) both under
public expenditure (continuos blue line) and taxation (red dotted line). In both
Figures consumption equivalent is a function of deleveraging speed, JB.
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1.6. Nominal Rigidities
Some of the results in the previous section hinge fundamentally on the assumption
of perfect price flexibility. Figure 2 shows that the real rate needs to go below zero
whenever the government reduces his public expenditure in order to deleverage. Neg-
ative real interest rates prevent real variables from experiencing large fluctuations.
While negative real interest rates have been observed in reality, this is generally not
the case for nominal interest rates, placing a lower bound on real rates too. I assume
then in this section that the Central Bank is constrained by the presence of the Zero
Lower Bound on nominal interest rates (eq. (1.17)).
In the previous formulation, additionally, firms were able to absorb negative demand
shocks by cutting nominal wages. Again, this might not be feasible since nominal
wage are downwardly rigid in the data. To capture such features in the context of my
experiment, I consider now positive Rotemberg adjustment costs and occasionally
binding downward wage rigidities. In subsection 1.6.1 I assume the presence of
Rotemberg costs without wage rigidities. Under this circumstance, I will analyze
only how simulations under public expenditure change, since this is the only instance
in which the real rate goes below zero. In subsection 1.6.2 I assume the presence of
both Rotemberg costs and nominal wage rigidities.
1.6.1. Rotemberg costs and the Zero Lower Bound
In this section and the following, I introduce the presence of a sizeable price rigidity4.
Under this formulation, the Central Bank sets a nominal interest rate that is equal
to zero whenever it had to be negative in the flexible price case. This will affect
government expenditure in two ways. On the one hand, the fiscal authority needs to
4Rotemberg cost φ = 77
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pay a higher real interest rate on public debt and, as a consequence, public expenditure
will have to decrease more. Moreover, the fall in public expenditure will further
depress output. Tax revenues fall and public expenditure decrease once more. Under
the Zero Lower Bound, the economy enters a vicious cycle of low public expenditure
and low output since, as shown by a strand of the literature5, the public expenditure
multiplier may be greater than one in this setup.
Note that, as Figure 5 shows, preferences of Savers and Hand-to-Mouth converge. As
explained in the sections above, under flexible prices, extreme deleveraging paths -
very slow or very fast - are the ones in which real interest rates fall more to clear
the market. Consequently, if the Zero Lower Bound binds, these will be the costliest
combinations for the economy. The Pareto optimal interval of values of JB shrinks
substantially, as extreme choices have become very unfavourable. Due to the larger
fall of productive government expenditure, Hand-to-Mouth consumers experience a
welfare loss that is higher than the one under flexible prices. Savers switch from a
welfare gain under flexible prices to a welfare loss.
It is now ambiguous whether Hand-to-Mouth prefers a debt reduction through taxa-
tion or public expenditure. For deleveraging paths of intermediate speed, as before,
Hand-to-Mouth prefers a reduction in public expenditure. For extreme cases, however,
as the Zero Lower Bound kicks in, he prefers the adjustment to take place through
taxes. As deleveraging that takes place via expenditure becomes more costly, Savers,
who preferred a taxation driven adjustment already, have their relative preferences
unchanged.
Inroducing the Zero Lower Bound, then, has a significant effect on agents’ welfare and
their choices. A fiscal authority who wishes to contract public expenditure to reduce
5Eggertsson(2009).
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debt needs to consider the possibility of entering a detrimental liquidity trap. Hence,
depending on deleveraging speed, it may be the case that distortionary taxation is a
more suitable policy instrument to achieve the desired result.
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Figure 5: Figure shows consumption equivalent as percentage of final steady state con-
sumption for Hand-to-Mouth consumers (first panel) and Savers (second panel)
under public expenditure and flexible prices (blue line), under taxation and flex-
ible prices (red dotted line) and under public expenditure and Rotemberg costs
(green line). In both Figures consumption equivalent is a function of deleveraging
speed, JB.
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1.6.2. Wage Rigidities
Recently, a big strand of the literature, like Benigno and Ricci (2011), Schmitt-Grohe´
and Ur´ıbe(2011) and Calvo et al. (2013) among others, has analyzed how nominal
downward wage rigidities affect economies both in the short and in the long run.
Downward wage rigidities, under certain condition, can magnify recessions : Since
firms are not able to decrease their costs, they will decrease their production. In the
next subsections I will study how the presence of downward wage rigidities together
with Rotemberg costs, changes agents’ welfare and preferences. In equation (1.13) I
set ψ, the parameter governing the extent of wage rigidity, to equal 0.97. As I will
show, downward nominal wage rigidities have a different impact according to the type
of recession the economy is facing.
Public Expenditure
To understand results under downward wage rigidities, it is useful to consider how
labor reacts during deleveraging under flexible prices. In this circumstance, when
debt reduction occurs, output falls and firms demand less labor. Savers, on one
hand, experiencing a boom in consumption, will enjoy more leisure. On the other
hand, Hand-to-Mouth, experiencing a negative shock on their consumption and public
expenditure, increase their labor supply. In equilibrium, then, Hand-to-Mouth wage
falls more than Savers’ one. Adding Rotemberg costs does not change labor markets
dynamics but, as I explained above, the economy is lead into a liquidity trap.
The introduction of downward wage rigidities directly affects the Hand-to-Mouth
labor market, since it is the one where wages fall the most. Firms, as a result of
the increase in wages, will hire less Hand-to-Mouth and more Savers. As Figures 6
and 7 show, adding downward wage rigidities only affects significantly labor market
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variables while aggregate variables remain largely unchanged due to the liquidity trap.
High labor market costs, indeed, exert an upward pressure on nominal prices, making
deflation less severe. Nominal interest rate will be still at zero. Consequently, the real
interest rate will either remain unchanged or slightly fall, either leaving unaffected or
mildly dampening the extent of the recession.
Downward wage rigidities under a liquidity trap, then, will be a transfer of resources
from Savers - who work more- to Hand-to-Mouth - who work less. This result critically
depends on the presence of the liquidity trap. As detailed by Eggertsson (2010), when
the Zero Lower Bound binds, the ”paradox of flexibility” may hold. This is a situation
in which flexible prices are more detrimental for the economy than rigid ones. Hence,
in this case, nominal rigidities, especially regarding wages, will not exacerbate the
cost of deleveraging on the economy.
As Figure 9 shows, downward wage rigidities reduce welfare costs for Hand-to-Mouth
agents, while increasing costs for Savers independently on the speed of debt reduction.
It is still ambiguous whether Hand-to-Mouth prefer public expenditure or taxation.
Indeed, for a fast deleveraging, they bear a lower welfare cost under public expendi-
ture, while, for a slow one, they are better off in the case of increase taxation. Agents’
preferences regarding the speed of deleveraging under public expenditure remain, in-
stead, unchanged.
A government willing to reduce debt through public expenditure needs to consider the
possibility of entering a liquidity trap. If this is case, there are few deleveraging paths
that are Pareto dominant, namely those that minimize the fall in public expenditure.
Moreover, a fiscal authority who wants to redistribute resources from the rich to the
poor may consider enforcing policies that increase the extent of wage rigidities. Note
that, in this analysis, I do not consider idiosyncratic effects of unemployment. It
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could be the case, in a more accurate analysis, that, ex-post, unemployed Hand-to-
mouth would be worse off under nominal wage rigidities. Indeed, the presence of these
kind of rigidities, may decrease the probability to become employed once a worker is
unemployed. This analysis is left for future research.
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Figure 6: Figure shows i.r.f. for the Savers and Hand-to-Mouth optimal deleveraging path
under Rotemberg costs and public expenditure experiment. Blue line are simu-
lations under Rotemberg costs, while red dotted line under Rotemberg cost and
wage rigidities. All the variable, except r, are in percentage deviation from the
final steady state. Real rate, r, is in percentage level.
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Figure 7: Figure shows the optimal deleveraging path for the Hand-to-Mouth under pub-
lic expenditure experiment and wage rigidities. Blue line are simulations under
Rotemberg costs, while red dotted line under Rotemberg cost and wage rigidities.
All the variable, except r, are in percentage deviation from the final steady state.
Real rate, r, is in percentage level.
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Taxation
When a government is deleveraging through taxation, downward wage rigidities,
whenever binding, are welfare decreasing. Since nominal wages increase, prices in-
creases too, exerting upward pressure on the inflation rate. As a consequence, the
Central Bank needs to raise the nominal interest rate and the government, paying an
higher real interest rate,has to raise taxes. The recession is, then, deeper than under
flexible prices. Differently than under the public expenditure experiment, aggregate
variables dynamics change significantly with the introduction of nominal wage rigidi-
ties, as Figure 1.13 shows. There Savers optimal deleveraging path under flexible
prices is compared with the same deleveraging path under wage rigidities.
Note that downward wage rigidities bind whenever the deleveraging speed is too slow
or too fast, as shown in Figure 9. Under these combinations, indeed, real interest
rates are very high in equilibrium, as explained in section 1.5.2. The higher interest
rates, the higher will be the shock on Hand-to-Mouth consumption and, as a result,
the higher will be their increase in labor supply. Consequently, under these debt
reduction paths, nominal wages fall substantially. Under flexible prices Savers were
the ones who preferred extreme debt deleveraging combinations, as they gained from
high real interest rates. This beneficial effect is now dampened by the cost introduced
by downward wage rigidities. They will prefer, then, the fastest debt reduction path
under which the downward wage rigidity does not bind. Hand-to-Mouth, on the other
hand, still find optimal the same debt reduction path they chose under flexible prices.
Despite the deep recession, Savers still gain in welfare term from a deleveraging that
occurs via taxation. Hence they keep preferring this experiment to the public ex-
penditure one . Hand-to-Mouth preferences change accordingly to the speed of debt
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reduction. If deleveraging is fast they prefer public expenditure, if instead it is slow
they prefer taxation.
Finally, it is important to highlight that, after the introduction of downward wage
rigidities, Savers’ optimal path is closer to the Hand-to-Mouth one. If the govern-
ment plays a Pareto dominant strategy, Hand-to-Mouth gain from the introduction
of downward wage rigidities. Indeed, the Pareto dominant interval shrinks, excluding
the combinations of deleveraging paths that decreased the most Hand-to-Mouth wel-
fare under flexible prices. Then, even under the taxation experiment, they will gain
from the introduction of downward wage rigidities.
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Figure 8: Figure shows i.r.f. under optimal Savers’ deleveraging path in the flexible prices
model (blue line). Red dotted line represents i.r.f under the same deleveraging
when downward wages rigidities bind . All the variables, except r, are in percent-
age deviation from the final steady state. Real interest rate, r, is in percentage
level.
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Figure 9: Figure shows consumption equivalent as percentage of final steady state con-
sumption for Hand-to-Mouth (fist panel) and Savers (second panel) under differ-
ent exercises: public expenditure (blue) and taxation (red) under flexible prices ,
public expenditure under Rotemberg cost (green), public expenditure (black) and
taxation (magenta) under Rotemberg cost and Downward wage rigidities. Both
Figures shows consumption equivalent as a function of deleveraging speed, JB.
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1.7. Time Span
Lastly I analyze whether and how the debt reduction time span changes agents’ wel-
fare. On one hand a longer time span decreases the size of the per-quarter shock, on
the other hand it takes more time for agents to achieve a constant level of consump-
tion. To address this question I focus on the Pareto dominant interval of deleveraging
paths. As all this combinations are Pareto optimal, the maximum achievable by one
agent corresponds to the minimum for the other. Figures 10 and 11 show the min-
imum and maximum consumption equivalent6 achievable by each type of agent as
function of debt deleveraging time span, T . Figure 10 shows, for the public expendi-
ture experiment, the relevant Pareto intervals under flexible prices, Rotemberg costs
and downward wage rigidities (with Rotemberg costs). Figure 11 corresponds to the
taxation experiment.
Under public expenditure Savers gain slightly from an increase in the time span.
Nevertheless, the magnitude of the gain is negligible. The effect of increasing the
time span on Hand-to-mouth welfare is instead significant and counterintuitive. As
T increases, Hand-to-Mouth welfare worsens, in both best and worst case scenarios.
Indeed, with a shorter time span, as the shock on output demand is larger, real
interest rates tend to be lower. The higher will be the time span, the higher will
be the real interest rate and the lower will be Hand-to-Mouth welfare. Moreover,
Figure 10 also shows that the Pareto interval widens, meaning that the higher the
time span, the more Savers and Hand-to-Mouth preferences will differ. Then, as T
increases, the variability of outcomes increases for the Hand-to-Mouth.
Under the taxation experiment, Savers are, again, indifferent to the time span, both
6Remember that the consumption equivalent is decreasing in welfare.
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under flexible prices and under downward wage rigidities. Hand-to-Mouth, on the
other hand , experience an improvement in their welfare, as the time span increases
. When a government reduces debt through taxation, interest rate are higher. As
T increases, the per-quarter-shock is smaller and, as a consequence, interest rates
increase less. Hand-to-Mouth, then, experience a welfare gain with an higher T .
Concluding, Savers are largely unaffected by the time span while this is not the case for
Hand-to-Mouth. Under taxation they would prefer a longer time span of deleveraging
while, under public expenditure, they want the fiscal authority to reduce debt in a
short time span. Since this variable is unimportant from the Savers’ point of view,
once chosen an instrument, the government, can adjust T to maximize Hand-to-Mouth
welfare.
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Figure 10: Figures show the minimum (blue continuos line) and maximum (red dotted
line) consumption equivalent as percentage of final steady state consumption as
a function of time span, T under the public expenditure experiment. The first
row refers to Hand-to-Mouth while the second to the Savers. First column refer
to Flexible Prices case, second to Rotemberg costs and the third to Rotemberg
costs plus downward wage rigidities
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Figure 11: Figures show the minimum (blue continuos line) and maximum (red dotted
line) consumption equivalent as percentage of final steady state consumption as
a function of time span, T under the public expenditure experiment. The first
row refers to Hand-to-Mouth while the second to the Savers. First column refer
to Flexible Prices case, second to Rotemberg costs and the third to Rotemberg
costs plus downward wage rigidities
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1.8. Conclusions
I analyze welfare implications of different paths of public deleveraging on different
types of agents. I find that, in a context of heterogenous agents and incomplete
markets, the speed of deleveraging is not inconsequential for agents’ welfare.
Deleveraging through income taxation leads to a recession with high real interest
rates. In this situation, agents, who hold public debt prefer extreme deleveraging
paths, while consumers who do not participate in the financial markets prefer slower
one. An economy choosing, instead, to reduce public debt using public expenditure
faces the risk to enter a liquidity trap. Under this circumstance, independently of
their participation in financial markets, agents prefer the path that minimizes the fall
in public expenditure.
Moreover, I find that downward wage rigidities are always detrimental for the agents
who participate in financial market. These rigidities, acting as a sort of insurance in
bad times, on the other hand, are helpful for the financial constrained.
The time span of deleveraging affects agents who do not participate in financial mar-
kets only, with little or no consequence for the others. Hence, the fiscal authority,
should adjust this variable to maximize aggregate welfare, if unconstrained otherwise.
Interesting results may emerge by relaxing some critical assumptions in this paper,
namely the presence of exogenous wealth distribution and perfect foresight. Firstly,
if poor agents were able to borrow, movements in the interest rate would directly
affect them too. Moreover, the introduction of uncertainty can also affect the con-
clusions of this paper. For example, introducing uninsurable unemployed risk among
the Hand-to-Mouth, I expect their preferences for nominal wage rigidities to change.
Exploration of these avenues is left for future research.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A
Proposition 2 If agents’ value functions are continuos, twice differentiable and con-
cave in JB with JBS < JBH (JBH < JBS), then the JBW that maximize W for a
generic a ∈ [0, 1], will lie in the interval [JBS, JBH ] ([JBH , JBS]). All the JB those
do not belong to this interval are Pareto dominated.
Proof. Being an argmax JBW satisfies the following condition:
We′(JBW ) = aWe′H(JB
W ) + (1− a)We′S(JBW ) = 0 (1.20)
whereWe′(.),We′H(.) andWe
′
S(.) are the first derivatives ofWe(.), WeH(.) andWeS(.)
with respect to JB.
By contradiction assume that JBW < JBS, then We′H(JB
W ) > 0 and We′S(JB
W ) >
0, then condition (1.20) will not be met. Again by contradiction assume that JBW >
JBH , then We′H(JB
W ) < 0 and We′S(JB
W ) < 0, then condition (1.20) will not be
met. If an argmax exists it should lie in the interval [JBS, JBH ].
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Appendix B
Agents Flexible Prices Rotemberg Costs (RC) RC and Wage Rigidities
Taxation
Hand-to-Mouth 1.75 1.75 1.75
Savers 0 0 0.7
Public Expenditure
Hand-to-Mouth 0.3 0.6 0.5
Savers 1.2 0.6 0.6
Table 2: This table shows optimal JB for Hand-to-Mouth and Savers both under public
expenditure and taxation experiment.
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CHAPTER 2
Debt Deleveraging and the Exchange Rate
1
2.1. Introduction
The decade leading up to the financial crisis was marked by divergences and disequilib-
ria. Global imbalances have been at the center of the debate, with several economists
warning against the unsustainability of the US external position. The euro area has
experienced internal current account divergences, producing an enormous accumula-
tion of debt. The crisis was most severe in the economies that had piled up too much
private or public debt in one form or another. It is still being debated whether the
divergences of the past actually caused the crisis or merely reflected other underlining
problems.2 In any case, the general tendency is for the crisis-ridden countries to re-
duce debt. In this deleveraging process, exchange-rate policies have been often placed
under scrutiny, as in the case between US and China or in reference to the choice of
irrevocably fixing exchange rates in the eurozone.
Debt deleveraging raises interesting questions on macroeconomic adjustment. A re-
cent literature, spurred by the works of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2010) and Philippon and Midrigan (2011), has studied the mechanism
of adjustment to debt deleveraging but in closed economies. So far the international
1I wrote this chapter with Prof. Pierpaolo Benigno.
2An interesting discussion is in Obstfeld (2011), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2010).
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consequences have been neglected. This is a gap that this work aims at filling given
the importance of the aforementioned debate on global and European imbalances.
There are two main contributions of this paper. First, to understand the interna-
tional transmission mechanism of debt deleveraging. Second, to discuss its welfare
consequences by asking how monetary and exchange-rate policies should be designed
to better accommodate from a global perspective the ensuing macroeconomic adjust-
ment.3
The transmission mechanism of a reduction in one country’s external debt presents
some familiar features with that of the old transfer problem, as discussed among
others in Keynes (1929). Deleveraging forces debtor countries to cut spending sharply
and depresses demand. Spending should increase in the rest of the world. But
international relative prices might not be immune to the adjustment.4 If the fall in
demand is sharper for domestic goods, which is the case when there is home bias in
consumption, the excess supply of these goods globally lowers their prices relative to
foreign prices and expands overall demand for them, thus easing the depressive impact
of deleveraging. These changes in relative prices are achieved by depreciation of the
deleveraging country’s currency. In the longer run, a country that has paid down
part of its debt is richer than at first, since there is less debt to serve, so the demand
for domestic goods is relatively higher. The exchange rate swings from short-term
depreciation to appreciation in the long run. But, without home bias, deleveraging
does not produce any movement in the exchange rate in both the short and long run.
Following the propagation mechanism described above, we could be tempted to con-
3It should be noted that none of the papers of Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010) and Philippon and Midrigan (2011) deals with the welfare consequences of debt
deleveraging.
4In the current debate on the unwinding of global imbalances, Feldstein (2011) and Krugman
(2011a,b) have stressed the importance of exchange rate movements in correcting global imbalances.
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clude that the exchange rate, and other international relative prices, should move
substantially to mitigate the costs of deleveraging, but only when there is home-bias
in goods consumption. Otherwise a fixed-exchange rate would be desirable. However,
this conclusion is completely misleading if viewed from the perspective of a benevo-
lent planner maximizing welfare in the global economy. Indeed, this planner dislikes
any large variations of consumption, output and relative prices and would prefer,
instead, to accommodate the adjustment in a smoother way. This is not feasible
and interesting trade-offs emerge between output, consumption and terms-of-trade
stabilization.
There are three available channels through which the global economy can absorb in
a better way a deleveraging shock. The first channel is a pure domestic one, already
emphasized by the closed-economy literature as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012).
The real interest rate in the deleveraging country should fall to reduce its borrowing
costs while adjusting to a lower level of debt. To this end, a policy in which the
interest rate of the deleverager stays at the zero-lower bound is desirable. The other
two channels have instead an international dimension: the expenditure-switching
channel and the fall in the real interest rate in the non-deleveraging countries.
The expenditure-switching channel driven by movements of the exchange rate is
clearly desirable from a global perspective to the extent that can mitigate the output
recession in the deleveraging country by shifting the burden of adjustment to other
countries. However, it leads to costs in terms of movements in the terms of trade,
which are unjustified by efficient shocks.5 In general, the benevolent planner dislikes
large variations of the exchange rate and other international relative prices. Indeed,
when the expenditure-switching effect is stronger because domestic and foreign goods
5An efficient shock that could justify such movements is a productivity shock.
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are more substitute, the optimal movements in the exchange rate are small. On the
contrary, when the expenditure-switching effect is too weak, a depreciation of the
currency can adversely reduce the real income of the country, making it even more
poor. Also in this case, the exchange rate should not depreciate much.
A fall in the real interest rate in the non-deleveraging countries is also desirable to the
extent that can raise foreign consumption to offset the recession in the deleverager.6
However, the rise in consumption in the rest of the world is also unjustified by efficient
shocks and therefore brings inefficiencies. When the expenditure-switching channel is
more effective, the fall in the foreign real rate is less needed. On the contrary, when
the expenditure-switching channel is weak, the real rate should fall substantially in
the rest of the world. In this case a global liquidity trap can be desirable as when
countries are more open to trade.
There are some earlier works related to our framework. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001,
2005, 2007) also studied the exchange-rate implications of a sudden improvement
in one country’s current account balance, conducting some comparative-static ex-
periments without analyzing the welfare consequences. Our focus here is on dy-
namic adjustment, on the role of monetary policy taking into account the zero lower
bound and on optimal monetary policy from a global perspective. Policies at the
zero lower bound, in an open economy, have been explored by Svensson (2001, 2003),
Jeanne (2009) and Fujiwara et al. (2010, 2011), but in different models without debt
deleveraging. There is also substantial literature on open economies analyzing credit-
constrained economies and the implications of relaxing or restricting credit access
for the equilibrium economy: see among others Aghion et al. (2001), Aoki et al.
(2010) and Mendoza (2010) and more recently Devereux and Yetman (2010). In an
6This channel has a parallel in the closed-economy literature where a fall in the real rate raises
consumption of savers.
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open-economy model, Cook and Devereux (2011) have studied the optimal response
to preferences’ shocks which bring one country to the zero lower bound while appre-
ciating its currency. In a recent work, Fornaro (2012) studies also international debt
deleveraging emphasizing similar mechanisms of adjustment as in our framework. He
is not concerned with welfare implications but analyzes mostly the occurrence of liq-
uidity traps under a monetary union. Bhattarai et al. (2013) study instead optimal
monetary policy in a currency-area model with financial frictions.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes a deleveraging shock in a
simple two-country open-economy endowment model. Section 2.3 extends the basic
model to include nominal rigidities and endogenous output. Section 2.4 discusses
optimal policy from a global perspective. Section 2.5 performs some robustness anal-
ysis by varying the degrees of home bias and the elasticity of substitution between
traded goods. Section 2.6 analyzes the case in which debt deleveraging concerns debt
denominated in foreign currency. Section 2.7 concludes. An online appendix reports
the main equations of the model and the solution method.7
2.2. A simple model
We adopt a simple two-country endowment economy to study how debt deleveraging
in one country spreads to the rest of the world economy. The two countries are Home,
denoted by H, and Foreign, denoted by F . Each country has an endowment of a good.
The two goods, H and F respectively, are traded frictionlessly. The representative
agent of country H maximizes utility from consumption
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct),
7The online appendix is available via the journal’s website.
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where β is the discount factor with 0 < β < 1. The consumption index C is a Cobb-
Douglas aggregator of the consumption of the two goods, CH (denoting Home goods)
and CF (denoting Foreign goods):
C =
(
CH
α
)α(
CF
1− α
)1−α
, (2.1)
where 0 < α < 1 represents the share of consumption of goods H in the overall
consumption basket, for a consumer of country H. Given the prices for the two goods,
PH and PF , expressed in the currency of country H, the consumption-based price
index of the Home country, P , is
P = PαHP
1−α
F .
Consumers in the Foreign country maximize their utility from consumption
∞∑
t=0
βtu(C∗t ),
where the consumption basket C∗ is:
C∗ =
(
C∗H
1− α∗
)1−α∗ (
C∗F
α∗
)α∗
, (2.2)
and now α∗, with 0 < α∗ < 1, is the weight given to goods F. The general price index
in country F is:
P ∗ = P ∗(1−α
∗)
H P
∗α∗
F ,
where P ∗H and P
∗
F are the prices of goods H and F in the currency of country F.
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The two goods are traded with no friction, and the law of one price holds
PF = SP
∗
F , PH = SP
∗
H ,
where S is the nominal exchange rate, defined as units of Home currency per unit of
Foreign currency. Preferences are biased towards domestic goods under the assump-
tion that α = α∗ > 1/2. In this case, our model generates deviations from purchasing
power parity (PPP), in which the real exchange rate (Q) is proportional to the terms
of trade T = PF/PH
Q =
SP ∗
P
=
(
PH
PF
)1−2α
= T 2α−1. (2.3)
Given preferences and prices, demands for the goods are:
CH = α
(
PH
P
)−1
C, CF = (1− α)
(
PF
P
)−1
C,
C∗H = (1− α∗)
(
P ∗H
P ∗
)−1
C∗, C∗F = α
∗
(
P ∗F
P ∗
)−1
C∗.
Consumers in the Home country receive in every period t an endowment YH,t of good
H, which they can sell at the price PH,t; they consume a bundle Ct of goods H and F
at price Pt; borrow or lend resources Dt+1/(1 + it), in units of currency of country H,
and pay back or receive the face value of the funds lent in the previous period Dt. A
positive value for D denotes nominal debt. D is the only asset traded internationally
and 1+ i is the one-period risk-free gross nominal interest rate on domestic currency.8
8Nominal bonds allow for meaningful asset trading even when consumption baskets are different
across countries.
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As a result, the flow budget constraint for consumers in the Home country is:
PtCt = PH,tYH,t +
Dt+1
1 + it
−Dt. (2.4)
There is a limit on the amount of real debt that the agent can take in each period
Dt
Pt
≤ k, (2.5)
where k > 0. Similar constraints have been used in other open-economy models, such
as Aoki et al. (2010), Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Mendoza (2010). They are
justified in terms of the guarantees that international creditors require when borrowers
have limited commitment. As in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), we do not model
the source of this constraint but interpret it as the maximum size of the debt that
can be considered safe and that international investors are willing to lend to country
H at each point in time. A change in this limit –in particular its reduction over time–
constitutes the debt-deleveraging experiment analyzed here.9 This drop can happen
just for a change in confidence triggered by an internal banking or financial crisis –not
modelled here– so that international investors are more reluctant to lend to country
H. In the equilibrium that we are going to analyze, consumers in country H will be
at the corner and (2.5) limits their borrowing capacity.
Looking now at country F, the flow budget constraint is:
P ∗t C
∗
t = P
∗
F,tY
∗
F,t +
D∗t+1
St(1 + it)
− D
∗
t
St
, (2.6)
where Y ∗F,t represents the endowment of good F and D
∗
t the holding of nominal debt
9The parameter k should be not larger than the natural borrowing limit, defined as the present
discounted value of all future income in units of the consumption good.
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in units of currency H. Consumers in country F face a similar borrowing limit in
units of their consumption basket:
D∗t
P ∗t St
≤ k∗, (2.7)
for a positive k∗. In the equilibrium that we are going to analyze, consumers in country
F will be creditors in international markets and the limit in (2.7) is not binding.
The optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption in country H is governed by
the following Euler equation:
Uc(Ct) ≥ β(1 + rt)Uc(Ct+1), (2.8)
where the home-country real interest rate is defined as
1 + rt ≡ (1 + it)Pt
Pt+1
.
Similarly, the Euler equation for consumers in country F is:
Uc(C
∗
t ) ≥ β(1 + r∗t )Uc(C∗t+1), (2.9)
where the foreign-country real interest rate is connected to the home-country real
rate through
(1 + rt) = (1 + r
∗
t )
Qt+1
Qt
.
Both Euler equations hold with equality when the borrowing limit is not binding.
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Equilibrium in goods and asset markets implies
YH,t = T
1−α
t [αCt + (1− α)QtC∗t ], (2.10)
Y ∗F,t = T
−α
t [(1− α)Ct + αQtC∗t ], (2.11)
Dt +D
∗
t = 0. (2.12)
Combining the equilibrium in the goods market, the terms of trade can be written as
Tt =
YH,t
Y ∗F,t
(
(1− α)Ct + αQtC∗t
αCt + (1− α)QtC∗t
)
, (2.13)
while the real exchange rate follows from Qt = T
2α−1
t .
Two results can be read directly from equation (2.13). First, a relative abundance
of Home over Foreign goods lowers Home prices relative to the Foreign (expressed
in the same currency), worsening the Home terms of trade and depreciating its real
exchange rate. If prices of goods are rigid in the endowment currency or if the
monetary authority strictly targets the domestic price level, this corresponds to a
nominal depreciation. Under these assumptions, in what follows, we use terms of
trade, real and nominal exchange rates interchangeably.10
Second, and more important, home bias in consumption is crucial in order for delever-
aging to influence the exchange rate. In fact, if preferences are identical across coun-
tries (α = 1/2), the terms of trade are independent of the distribution of wealth and
10In the model with nominal rigidities the decomposition of the terms of trade into prices and
exchange rate movements will follow naturally from the interaction between price rigidities and
monetary policy.
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just proportional to the ratio of the endowments of the two goods.11 Instead, when
there is home bias, the distribution of wealth and debt across countries can also affect
relative prices through the demand channel. Imagine that deleveraging in the Home
country reduces Home consumption. Since Home consumers demand more of their
own goods, the fall in Home consumption depresses the demand for Home goods more
than that for Foreign goods. The price of the Home goods relative to Foreign falls,
worsening the Home terms of trade and depreciating the Home currency. In these
cases, exchange rate management is a factor in the debt-deleveraging transmission
mechanism.
2.2.1. Steady state
A deleveraging shock produced by a lowering of the debt limit k in the Home country
requires some time to be absorbed. In this section we abstract from the adjustment
process and compare the initial and final steady-state equilibria. We start from an
initial steady state in which the distribution of wealth is such that consumers in
the home country come up against their borrowing limit. This is a feasible choice
because the initial distribution of wealth is indeterminate given that agents in the
two countries share the same discount factor. Steady-state Home and Foreign real
interest rates (r¯ and r¯∗) are tied to the subjective discount factor β
(1 + r¯∗) = (1 + r¯) =
1
β
, (2.14)
where an upper bar denotes variables at their steady-state levels. Debt in the Home
country is at the borrowing limit (2.5), and the steady-state level of consumption
11This is a standard result that depends on the assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences, as in
Cole and Obstfled (1991).
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follows from the budget constraint (2.4)
C¯ = T¯α−1Y¯H − (1− β)k. (2.15)
Combining (2.3), (2.6) and (2.12) consumption in the Foreign country is given by
Q¯C¯∗ = T¯αY¯ ∗F + (1− β)k. (2.16)
The steady-state terms of trade can be simply obtained by appropriately incorporat-
ing (2.15) and (2.16) into (2.13)
T¯ =
Y¯H
Y¯ ∗F
[
1 + (1− β)
(
2α− 1
1− α
)
k
T¯α−1Y¯H
]
. (2.17)
Interestingly, the terms of trade and the real exchange rate depend on the level of
debt and the distribution of wealth, but only when there is home bias in consump-
tion, i.e. when α > 1/2. When we move from a high- to a low-debt equilibrium (k
falls), equation (2.17) shows that the terms of trade improve in the long run. Indeed,
consumption for the constrained borrowers is higher in the final than in the initial
steady state, since they have less debt and can service it at less real cost. On the
contrary, Foreign consumers have to lower consumption. Since there is home bias,
the demand for Home goods increases relative to that of Foreign goods in the long
run, the terms of trade of country H improve and the real exchange rate rises. The
interesting part of the exercise, however, is the short-run adjustment, which is com-
pletely different in form, actually swinging from a short-run currency depreciation to
a long-run appreciation.
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2.2.2. Adjustment to a deleveraging shock in country H
We now study the dynamic adjustment to a deleveraging shock that hits country
H. Let us say that for exogenous reasons, there is a fall in the maximum amount of
external debt that can be considered risk-free: the debt ceiling k drops from khigh to
klow. The adjustment takes place in two periods, the short run and the long run.
In the long run, denoted by a bar, the results of section (2.2.1) apply. The real interest
rate follows from (2.14) while T¯ , C¯, C¯∗ and Q¯ solve equations (2.3), (2.13), (2.15) and
(2.16). With respect to the initial steady state, consumption in the Home country
will be higher in the long run, since there is less debt to serve. Specularly, it will be
lower in the Foreign country. The terms of trade of the Home country improves if
there is home bias. Otherwise, it will be unaffected.
In the short run, the flow budget constraint of the Home country implies:
C = Tα−1YH +
klow
1 + r
− khigh, (2.18)
and Foreign consumption follows specularly
QC∗ = TαY ∗F −
klow
1 + r
+ khigh. (2.19)
Euler equations of the consumers in the Foreign country link short and long-run
consumption through the real interest rate
1
C∗
=
1
C¯∗
β(1 + r∗), (2.20)
where we have assumed log utility, while the Euler equation of the Home consumer
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holds with an inequality because of the borrowing limit. In the short run, the Home
and Foreign rates are related to the changes in the real exchange rate between the
short and the long run
1 + r = (1 + r∗)
Q¯
Q
. (2.21)
Using short- and long-run consumption in the Euler equation (2.20) of country F , we
obtain an expression for the short-run real interest rate
(1 + r) =
1
β
[
T¯αY¯ ∗F + klow
TαY ∗F + khigh
]
. (2.22)
The short-run real rate depends on movements in the terms of trade and debt positions
between the short and the long run for a given path of output, which is exogenous
and can be considered constant through the exercise. Equation (2.22) determine r,
T given that T is also a function of klow as discussed in the previous section. The
additional equilibrium condition comes from combining (2.13), (2.18) and (2.19) into
T =
YH
Y ∗F
[
1 +
2α− 1
1− α
1
Tα−1YH
(
khigh − klow
1 + r
)]
,
Some qualitative implications for the short-run terms of trade can be inferred already
from this equation, again assuming home bias in consumption, which is necessary
in order for the dynamic and the distribution of debt to affect the terms of trade.
When country H is deleveraging with respect to the world, then it is easy to see that
the terms of trade in the short run, T, will move to a higher level. Therefore, the
exchange rate of the Home country will depreciate in the short run but appreciate in
the long run. In a world without home bias, the terms of trade will be completely
insulated from the deleveraging shock. As in the closed-economy model of Eggertsson
and Krugman (2012), a deleveraging shock produces a fall in the Home real interest
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rate, as shown in (2.22), which is enhanced by the short and long-run movements of
the terms of trade under the assumption of home bias. In this case, the real rate in
the Home country falls more than the real rate of the Foreign country, as shown in
(2.21).
For a first assessment of the magnitude of the impact of deleveraging on the world
economy, we calibrate the model assuming that each period corresponds to one year.
In the next section, we consider a more general environment in which deleveraging
is spread endogenously over several periods, but in a quarterly model. Here, in a
yearly model, considering a steady-state real rate of 2.5% per year we can calibrate
β∗ = 0.9756. We set α = 0.76, which is consistent with the share of US non-durable
consumption spending that goes to US-made products, as shown in Hale and Hobijn
(2011). We set khigh = 0.4 to match the 40% of the US net external position in
debt securities over GDP that Gourinchas, Govillot and Rey (2010) report for the
year 2008. We imagine alternative scenarios in which external domestic debt over
GDP, defined as dgdp, is reduced from 40% to 30%, to 25% and 20%, respectively.
12
According to Gourinchas, Govillot and Rey (2010), the net external debt position of
US before the crisis was around 20% in 2002 and around 30% in 2006.
Figure 1 shows the adjustment of Home and Foreign consumption, Home and Foreign
real interest rates, the terms of trade and Home external debt as a fraction of GDP
after a deleveraging shock. As discussed in Section (2.2.1), the terms of trade improve
in the long run because the Home country reduces its debt exposure and so has more
resources available to buy goods. Since there is home bias in preferences, the demand
for domestic goods rises together with their relative price. In quantitative terms, the
figure shows that all the variables display a negligible difference between the initial
12We normalize Y¯H = 1 so that d¯ = khigh/Y¯H = 0.4.
61
and final steady states. In the short run, the adjustment takes different direction and
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Figure 12: Responses of Home and Foreign consumption (C,C∗), Home and Foreign real
interest rates (r, r∗), the terms of trade (T ) and the Home external debt position
over GDP (dgdp), to a deleveraging shock that brings the external debt-to-GDP
ratio down from 40% to 30%, 25%, 20%. The variables r, r∗ and dgdp are in
percents the others are in percentage deviation with respect to the initial steady
state.
magnitude. Home consumers must reduce their consumption drastically in order to
repay debt. Because of home bias, aggregate demand for goods H drops more sharply,
so the terms of trade worsen, implying a sharp depreciation of the Home currency
close to 15% for severe shocks. Since in the short run deleveraging borrowers reduce
their demand for goods more than in the long run, the real interest rate falls, an
offsetting factor that generates more consumption by consumers in country F . The
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real interest rate falls more in H than in F, as is shown in equation (2.21), since the
terms of trade (and the real exchange rate) rise in the short run before falling in the
long run. Notice that starting from a real interest rate of 2.5% the deleveraging shock
drives both Home and Foreign rates below zero; and when deleveraging is severe far
below zero, to −20% or more. Consumption in country H can fall even up to 15%
while that of country F specularly rises with the same magnitude.
2.2.3. Efficiency
The simple model shows that consumption, real interest rates and the terms of trade
move significantly following a deleveraging shock. But, are these movements efficient?
To address this question, we should define the efficient allocation in our model which
critically depends on the efficient distribution of wealth. Since the latter changes
during the deleveraging experiment, there is not an obvious choice. To sharpen our
analysis, we can think at our deleveraging experiment as one that brings the world
economy from an inefficient distribution of wealth to an efficient one. The Home coun-
try, for un-modelled reasons, has accumulated too much external debt and suddenly
is forced to repay part of it to reach the efficient level.
To define the efficient allocation, we solve the maximization of the aggregate welfare
∞∑
t=0
βt {ξ ln(Ct) + (1− ξ) ln(C∗t )}
for some Pareto weight ξ given the two resource constraints (2.10) and (2.11). In
particular the Pareto weight ξ is chosen in such a way that in the final steady state
the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption is proportional to the real exchange
rate
ξ
1− ξ
C¯∗
C¯
=
1
Q¯
.
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As shown in the Appendix, by taking a second-order approximation of the above
objective function with respect to the final steady state and combining it with a
second-order approximation of the resource constraints (2.10) and (2.11), a quadratic
loss function follows
Lt =
1
2
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ξC˜2t + (1− ξ)(C˜∗t )2 + α(1− α)T˜ 2t
}
(2.23)
which appropriately penalizes deviations of the target variables with respect to the fi-
nal steady state, and through which it is possible to evaluate the costs of deleveraging.
In the loss function (2.23), a variable with a tilde denotes a deviation of that variable
with respect to the final efficient steady state. Any departure of consumption, Home
and Foreign, and the terms of trade from their final steady-state values is costly. In
particular, the terms of trade are a distinct objective since in a model with multiple
goods misalignments of relative prices with respect to their efficient levels are costly
because they produce a misallocation of real resources across different uses.
The world economy would be better off by forgiving the inefficient part of the Home-
country external debt in a way to immediately achieve the efficient allocation. Obvi-
ously, this could entail non-negligible costs –not considered in our framework– which
make this option not viable. However, even an orderly deleveraging process, with the
large swings shown in Figure 1, can be costly. In particular, the costs can be as high
as a 0.036% permanent reduction in the steady-state consumption of both countries
when considering the worst scenario in which external debt drops from 40% to 20%.
These costs are not huge but it should be noted that we are evaluating them in terms
of a permanent reduction in steady-state consumption, while the adjustment process
lasts only two periods. Instead, if we evaluate the costs in terms of a temporary fall
in steady-state consumption for an already long ten-year horizon, the drop is around
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0.16% in the worst scenario. For a five-year horizon it is around 0.31%.13
It is important to add that even in the case in which there is no home bias, and
therefore the terms of trade do not move, there are costs of deleveraging according
to (2.23). Whether the terms of trade (or the exchange rate) move or do not move
should not be interpreted as a symptom of a correct or wrong adjustment to global
imbalances.
Some lessons can be drawn from this simple open-economy model. In addition to the
channel identified in the closed-economy literature –i.e. that deleveraging produces
a fall in the real interest rate– there is an additional mechanism acting through the
terms of trade but only if there is home bias in preferences. In this case, the exchange
rate of the deleveraging country depreciates on impact and then appreciates in the
long run. Consumption of the deleveraging country falls while that of the foreign
economy increases given the low real rates. Moreover the real interest rate of the
deleverager falls more than that of the other country, again under the assumption of
home bias.
We have also shown that the adjustment process is in general inefficient, if we take
the perspective that the final distribution of wealth reached after deleveraging is
instead efficient. This observation opens room for policy options to mitigate the
adjustment. However, the simple model presented in this section is of a rather limited
use. Three options would be available: 1) debt forgiveness; 2) default; 3) transfers
across countries. While the model is not suitable to evaluate the costs of the two
former options, the latter one is also hard to enforce for completely disjoint political
entities.14 In what follows, we analyze the role of monetary policy in a framework in
13These costs might be also considered as an upper bound below which the costs of debt forgiveness
or default could become a better option.
14A currency union can be an exception. Fornaro (2013) studies debt-relief policy, in the form of
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which the above three options are not available or used.
There is a further limitation of the model presented above, namely the assumption
of endowment economies which limits the extent to which the exchange rate can be
an important element in the adjustment process. Indeed, relative-price movements
driven by variations in the exchange rate can produce expenditure-switching effects
across countries which can mitigate the costs for the deleverager. To this end, in
the next section, we extend the model to allow for endogenous production. We also
assume nominal rigidities, consistent with the empirical evidence on the real effects
of monetary policy shocks, and study the relevance of different exchange-rate regimes
and monetary policies in the adjustment to international deleveraging.
2.3. A model with endogenous production and nominal rigidities
The model used in this section closely follows those of the open-economy macro
literature, such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001, 2005) and Benigno (2009). The new
elements here with respect to the simple model of the previous section are nominal
rigidities, endogenous output, debt deleveraging on a longer horizon and more general
preference specifications.
Three factors can delay the adjustment to a deleveraging shock and create interesting
dynamics. First, nominal rigidity slows the response of relative prices and can lead
to a contraction in real output. Second, the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate can prevent real rates from falling, depressing aggregate demand and output.
Finally, the exchange-rate regime may either attenuate or amplify the response of
real and nominal exchange rates.
Households in country H, a continuum of measure one, have preferences over con-
a transfer of wealth from creditors to debtors, in a closed economy.
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sumption and work hours as follows:
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−ρt
1− ρ −
∫ 1
0
[Lt(j)]
1+η
1 + η
dj
]}
,
where Lt(j) is hours worked of variety j; η ≥ 0 the inverse of the labor-supply
elasticity and ρ > 0 the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption. Every household can supply all varieties of labor; C is a consumption
bundle of goods H and F given by
C =
(
α
1
θC
θ−1
θ
H + (1− α)
1
θC
θ−1
θ
F
) θ
θ−1
,
where α, with α ≥ 1/2, represents still the weight given to home-produced goods in
the consumption bundle while θ, with θ > 0, is the intratemporal elasticity of substi-
tution between Home and Foreign-produced goods. The Cobb-Douglas case (2.1) of
the previous section is nested when θ = 1. Given this preference, the consumption-
based price index is given by
P =
(
αP 1−θH + (1− α)P 1−θF
) 1
1−θ .
Differently from the previous section, we now assume that CH is composed of a
continuum of goods c(h) of measure one all produced in country H, while CF is a
continuum of goods, c(f), produced in country F :
CH =
[∫ 1
0
c(h)
σ−1
σ dh
] σ
σ−1
CF =
[∫ 1
0
c(f)
σ−1
σ df
] σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country.
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The price indices PH and PF are:
PH =
[∫ 1
0
P (h)1−σdh
] 1
1−σ
PF =
[∫ 1
0
P (f)1−σdf
] 1
1−σ
,
where P (h) and P (f) are the prices of the goods h and f denominated in the currency
of country H. Households in country H face the following flow budget constraint:
PtCt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj + Ψt +
Dt
1 + it
−Dt−1 − ktPt · χ˜
(
dt
kt
,
d¯t
kt
)
(2.24)
where Wt(j) is the nominal wage for the variety of work j and Ψt are firms’ profits,
which are distributed to the households in equal proportion. In the flow budget con-
straint (2.24) we have added a function χ˜(·, ·), appropriately normalized, capturing
costs of adjusting the debt position. The function depends on the real debt of the
individual households, dt = Dt/Pt, with respect to a threshold kt and of the country’s
aggregate real debt, given by d¯t, again with respect to the same threshold. Excess
borrowing, above a certain limit, is costly and may reflect intermediation frictions
related to the monitoring that lenders perform when exerting too much credit. We
assume that the function χ˜(·, ·) is always non-negative, χ˜(·, ·) ≥ 0 since it reflects
only costs and not benefits. Moreover, the derivatives of the function with respect to
individual debt, χ˜d(·, ·), and to aggregate debt, χ˜d¯(·, ·), are non-negative χ˜d(·, ·) ≥ 0
and χ˜d¯(·, ·) ≥ 0. In particular, we assume that χ˜d(1, 1) = 0 which is a sort of op-
timality condition for individual borrowing saying that at the risk-free level of debt
the marginal cost of increasing the borrowing capacity is zero. However, increases in
aggregate debt above the risk-free threshold are costly at the margin, χ˜d¯(1, 1) > 0.
15
The assumption that the individual cost of borrowing depends also on aggregate debt
is not only convenient for technical reasons, as it will be explained later, but also
15We further assume that the second derivatives are such that χ˜d,d(1, 1) + χ˜d,d¯(1, 1) > 0.
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because it might capture several features of the recent financial crisis. For the same
characteristics of the individual borrowers, financial intermediaries might charge a
different premium on lending depending on the aggregate conditions if these reflect
different degrees of vulnerability of the financial system to systemic risk. The aggre-
gate level of debt might be an important signal of this vulnerability since it might
imply or predict a worsening of the balance sheets of intermediaries in the case in
which more non-performing loans materialize when macroeconomic conditions worsen.
Moreover, given the interdependence of the financial system, an overall higher level
of aggregate debt might facilitate the contagion of a poor creditworthiness of some
sectors of the economy to others, and therefore exacerbate adverse-selection problems
in exerting credit to individual borrowers. In a nutshell, during the financial crisis,
even reliable borrowers faced a worsening in their credit conditions because of the
weakening of the overall financial system due to the high level of debt and leverage
accumulated in the past.
The deleveraging experiment that we consider in this section involves a one-time
reduction in the threshold kt which, given the structure of the economy, produces a
dynamic adjustment of debt and other aggregate variables. In particular, the zero-
lower bound constraint is mainly responsible of the dynamic adjustment. We assume
that kt changes from kmax to kmin.
16 This might capture a banking or financial crisis,
or just a change in confidence, such that excess borrowing above the lower threshold is
now costly. Therefore, borrowers need to deleverage. It should be noted that through
the cost function the steady-state debt position of households is determined in our
16The one-period deleveraging experiment of the previous section can be also seen as a limiting
case of the modelling device used in this section, when the cost of adjustment with respect to the
threshold is infinite. Notice also that, as in the model of the previous section, any level of initial debt
d such that d ≤ kmax is consistent with the steady-state equilibrium, since χ˜(·, ·) ≥ 0, χ˜d(1, 1) ≥ 0
and partial derivatives are non-negative. We set d = kmax. The analysis further shows that when k
falls to kmin, the level of debt d is adjusted gradually to kmin from above.
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model, a device often used in the literature. Moreover, as it will be shown later,
the fact that the cost function depends on individual debt is going to be reflected,
through optimality conditions of households, into a borrowing premium.17
Similarly, preferences of households in country F are:
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C∗1−ρt
1− ρ −
∫ 1
0
[L∗t (i)]
1+η
1 + η
di
]}
,
where C∗t is now given by
C∗ =
(
(1− α) 1θ (C∗H)
θ−1
θ + α
1
θ (C∗F )
θ−1
θ
) θ
θ−1
and the related consumption-based price index is
P ∗ =
(
(1− α)(P ∗H)1−θ + α(P ∗F )1−θ
) 1
1−θ .
L∗t (i) represents hours worked of type i in foreign firms. The consumption bundles
C∗H and C
∗
F and the appropriate consumption-based price indices P
∗
H and P
∗
F have the
same structure as those of country H, whereas P ∗(h) and P ∗(f) are now the prices of
the goods h and f expressed in the currency of country F. The law of one price holds
for each traded good (i.e., P (h) = SP ∗(h) and P (f) = SP ∗(f)) but, as explained in
Section 2.2, there can be deviations from PPP because of Home bias. Households in
country F face a flow budget constraint:
P ∗t C
∗
t =
∫ 1
0
W ∗t (i)L
∗
t (i)di+ Ψ
∗
t + TR
∗
t +
B∗t
1 + i∗t
+
D∗t
(1 + it)St
−B∗t−1 −
D∗t−1
St
,
17In a log-linear approximation, the model will be isomorphic to one in which the interest-rate is
assumed to be elastic with repect to the individual and aggregate debt.
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where W ∗t (i) is nominal wage for the variety of work i, Ψ
∗
t are Foreign profits. In
writing the flow budget constraint of the foreign consumers, we are assuming that
they can borrow and lend also in bonds denominated in their own currency, B∗t , at
the interest rate 1 + i∗t . However, we assume that these securities are in zero-net
supply within the country. The only asset traded internationally is denominated in
the currency of country H, and consumers of country F hold D∗t units of it.
18 In
writing the budget constraint for consumers in country F , we are neglecting the
costs of adjusting their debt position because in the equilibrium that we are going
to analyze these consumers will be creditors in the international financial markets,
and therefore they are not subject to costs of excessive borrowing. Moreover, the
borrowing costs of consumers in country H are transferred in terms of profits of
intermediation to the consumers in country F . Indeed these profits are given by
TR∗t = Ptktχ˜
(
dt/kt, d¯t/kt
)
/St.
19
Turning to the consumer’s optimality conditions, the stochastic version of the Euler
equation (2.9) still describes the intertemporal allocation of consumption in country
F and holds with equality at an interior optimum
(C∗t )
−ρ = β(1 + it)Et
{
(C∗t+1)
−ρ St
St+1
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
}
,
while the Euler equation of the Home country changes to
(Ct)
−ρ
{
1− (1 + it)ψ
(
dt
kt
)}
= β(1 + it)Et
{
(Ct+1)
−ρ Pt
Pt+1
}
,
where ψ (dt/kt) = ktχ˜d(dt/kt, d¯t/kt) since in equilibrium dt = d¯t. The cost of excessive
18In equilibrium Dt +D
∗
t = 0.
19The welfare analysis of next section simplifies substantially under this assumption. Otherwise,
goods market equilibria will be affected by the costs of intermediation and bring additional effects
in the quadratic approximation of the objective function.
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borrowing for households in country H endogenously implies a premium in addition
to the interest rate paid. Note that when dt = kt, ψ (·) = 0 and we retrieve the
standard Euler equation.20
The Euler equation of households in country F with respect to holdings of securities
denominated in their currency reads as
(C∗t )
−ρ = β(1 + i∗t )Et
{
(C∗t+1)
−ρ P
∗
t
P ∗t+1
}
.
By combining the two Euler equations for the households in country F , we get that
the excess return of investing in foreign versus domestic currency is orthogonal to the
stochastic discount factor of the foreign household
Et
{
β
(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−ρ
P ∗t
P ∗t+1
[
(1 + i∗t )− (1 + it)
St
St+1
]}
= 0,
which in a log-linear approximation delivers the standard uncovered-interest-rate-
parity condition.
In both countries there is a continuum of firms, each producing one of the goods.
Firms use all the varieties of labor offered in the country, combining them through
the following technologies
y(h) =
[∫ 1
0
Lh(j)
τ−1
τ dj
] τ
τ−1
y∗(f) =
[∫ 1
0
Lf (i)
τ−1
τ di
] τ
τ−1
,
where τ is the elasticity of substitution across varieties of labor, with τ > 1. We
assume that firms operate under monopolistic competition, setting their prices in a
20The assumptions on the cost function χ˜(·, ·) imply that ψd (1) > 0. Instead, if the cost function
depends only on the first argument, it would be the case that ψd (1) = 0. In this case it follows that,
in a first-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions, there will be no effect, both in the Euler
equation of borrowers and in their budget constraint, of assuming costs of portfolio adjustment.
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flexible way. It follows that pt(h) = PH,t = µWt for each h and p
∗
t (f) = P
∗
F,t = µW
∗
t
for each f , where Wt and W
∗
t are aggregate nominal wages in the respective currencies
and the price markup is µ ≡ σ/(σ − 1). While prices are flexible, wages adjust in a
staggered way following Calvo’s model in which unions, grouping work of the same
variety, have monopolistic power in setting wages. In each period, in country H (F ),
only a fraction 1 − λ (1 − λ∗) of the varieties of labor, with 0 < λ, λ∗ < 1, can have
their wages reset according to the macroeconomic conditions and independently of
the last adjustment. The remaining fraction of varieties of labor, of measure λ (λ∗),
can only index their wages to the current inflation target, Π¯ (Π¯∗), which does not
necessarily coincide with actual inflation. It is clear that wage rigidity translates
directly into price rigidity, since we do not have productivity shock. The resulting
aggregate-supply equations are standard for this kind of model. The set of equilibrium
conditions is presented in detail in the online appendix.
2.4. Optimal adjustment to international deleveraging
In this section we ask how a benevolent central planner, maximizing the utility of the
world economy, would optimally react to a deleveraging shock hitting country H. A
natural objective of policy is the maximization of the weighted average of the utility
of the consumers in the world economy, which is given by
Ut = Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ξ
(
C1−ρt
1− ρ −
∫ 1
0
[Lt(j)]
1+η
1 + η
dj
)
+ (1− ξ)
(
C∗1−ρt
1− ρ −
∫ 1
0
[L∗t (i)]
1+η
1 + η
di
)]}
.
(2.25)
In particular, consistent with the previous analysis, we choose appropriately the
weight ξ so that the steady state reached after deleveraging is efficient. As before, our
experiment entails a reduction of debt that brings the economy from an inefficient
allocation to an efficient one. To this end, we assume that there are appropriate sub-
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sidies which eliminate the monopolistic distortions in the labour markets. The final
steady state is described by the following set of equilibrium conditions
C¯ = p¯H Y¯H − (1− β)Π¯−1kmin,
Q¯C¯∗ = p¯F Y¯ ∗F + (1− β)Π¯−1kmin,
Y¯H = p¯
−θ
H [αC¯ + (1− α)Q¯θC¯∗]
Y¯ ∗F = p¯
−θ
F [(1− α)C¯ + αQ¯θC¯∗]
Y¯ ηH = p¯HC¯
−ρ
Y¯ ∗ηF = p¯F Q¯
−1(C¯∗)−ρ
1 = αp¯1−θH + (1− α)p¯1−θF
Q¯ =
(
(1− α)p¯1−θH + αp¯1−θF
) 1
1−θ
which clearly determine the allocation of C¯, C¯∗, Y¯H , Y¯ ∗F , Q¯, p¯H , p¯F given the level of
debt kmin reached after deleveraging and the steady-state inflation rate in country H,
Π¯.21 It is also easy to show that an efficient allocation should satisfy the condition
ξ
1− ξ
(
C¯
C¯∗
)−ρ
=
1
Q¯
which indeed is the one determining the weight ξ given the above derived C¯, C¯∗ and
Q¯.
The fact that the new steady state is efficient simplifies a lot the analysis. Indeed, by
taking a second-order approximation of (2.25) around the efficient steady state and
21Notice that one equation is redundant. We have also defined pH = PH/P and pF = PF /P.
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combining it with the resource constraints, we obtain an expression containing only
quadratic terms which can be correctly evaluated through a first-order approximation
of the equilibrium conditions. Details are left to the online appendix. Maximization
of the above utility function corresponds to minimization of the following loss function
Lt =
1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ϕ1C˜
2
t + ϕ2(C˜
∗
t )
2 + ϕ3T˜
2
t + ϕ4Y˜
2
H,t + ϕ5Y˜
∗2
F,t + ϕ6(piH,t − p¯i)2 + ϕ7(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)2
]}
(2.26)
for some non-negative parameters ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4, ϕ5, ϕ6, ϕ7 discussed in the online
appendix; the variables C˜t, C˜
∗
t , Y˜H,t,Y˜
∗
F,t, T˜ represent log deviations with respect to
the final steady state of the respective variables, while piH,t and pi
∗
F,t are the Home
and Foreign producer inflation rates and p¯i and p¯i∗ are their respective targets such
that p¯i = ln Π¯ and p¯i∗ = ln Π¯∗.
According to the loss function (2.26), the benevolent central planner dislikes devi-
ations of the producer inflation rates in each country from their respective targets.
This captures the costs of wage dispersion due to misallocation of labor demand across
varieties which have the same level of efficiency. Moreover deviations of output, con-
sumption in each country and the terms of trade from their efficient levels are also
penalized. It is optimal to keep the GDP inflation rates at their targets and at the
same time to achieve immediate stabilization of output, consumption and the terms
of trade at the efficient levels.
However, the efficient allocation can only be reached in the long run when delever-
aging ends, while it is not feasible in the short run mainly for two reasons: first, as
shown in the simple model of Section 2, an adjustment to a deleveraging shock brings
about movements in output, consumption and relative prices whose direction con-
trasts with the efficient movements built into the objective (2.26), creating therefore
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important trade-offs; second, a policy of keeping GDP inflation rates at their targets
p¯i and p¯i∗ at all times may not be feasible because, as shown again in Section 2, a
deleveraging shock produces negative real interest rates which, with constant inflation
rates, require the nominal interest rates to go below zero and violate the zero-lower
bound constraint.22
Given the loss function (2.26) we solve for the linear-quadratic optimal-policy problem
taking into account the zero-lower bound constraints.23 We analyze the effects of
an unanticipated deleveraging shock that moves k immediately from kmax to kmin.
The shock produces a dynamic path of deleveraging which depends endogenously on
policy. In particular we calibrate kmax and kmin such that the Home country external
debt with respect to GDP moves from an initial level of 40% to reach a final steady
state of 30% at the end of deleveraging. In particular kmax is set at 1.6095 while
kmin at 1.2054. The model is calibrated quarterly. We set β = 0.9938 to imply a
2.5% real annual return on a yearly basis. The steady-state inflation rates are set
to Π¯ = Π¯∗ = 1.005 to imply a 2% inflation rates on a yearly basis in each country.
These imply that p¯i = p¯i∗ = 2% at annual rates. We set the parameter α = 0.76 as in
previous section and calibrate the parameters σ and τ to 7.66, implying steady-state
mark-ups in goods and labor market equal to 15%. The inverse of the elasticity of
substitution in consumption, ρ, is set to 2, consistent with a number of studies, and
the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, η, is set to 1.5, which is in the range of
the estimates of De Walque et al (2005) in a two-country model of the euro area and
the US. The degree of wage rigidities is also taken from De Walque et al. (2005); λ
and λ∗ are set equal to 0.8, which is consistent with their estimates and implies a
duration of wages of 5 quarters in both countries (this is also in line with other micro
22Even in this context debt forgiveness or appropriately-defined transfers can achieve the efficient
allocation provided each monetary policy follows its inflation target.
23See the online appendix for the details.
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studies). Finally the elasticity of substitution across Home and Foreign goods is set
at a unitary value consistent with what often assumed in several studies, θ = 1. In the
next section, we are going to perform robustness analysis along different assumptions
on θ and α. Finally, the borrowing cost creates, in a log-linear approximation, a
spread between the interest rate faced by the borrowers in the Home country and the
risk-free rate. This spread depends on the distance between the level of borrowing
and what is considered the risk-free threshold of debt
ıˆbt − ıˆt ≡ $1(dˆt − kˆt).
In particular, as shown in the online appendix, ıˆbt , the effective borrowing rate, is
the relevant nominal interest rate entering the log-linear approximation of the Euler
equation and the external budget constraint of country H. The parameter $1 is set
at 0.047 in such a way that on impact the drop in k, considering a constant debt d,
produces a 4.5% spread at annual rates which is consistent with the peak of the TED
spread observed during the US financial crisis.
Figures 13 and 14 show the optimal adjustment following the deleveraging shock
under the benchmark calibration compared with a policy in which both countries aim
at targeting GDP inflation at 2%, piH,t = pi
∗
F,t = 2%. These inflation-targeting policies
are of particular interest since have been often found to be the welfare-maximizing
policies under cooperation in open-economy models. Indeed, they are the optimal
cooperative policies in our model in the absence of deleveraging shocks and under
an efficient distribution of wealth across countries.24 Moreover, the adoption of such
inflation-targeting policies by many developed countries before the crisis makes them
24This is true in models in which there is producer-currency pricing as in the framework of this
paper (see Benigno and Benigno, 2006). Engel (2011) shows that with local-currency pricing it is
optimal to stabilize CPI inflation rates.
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Figure 13: Impulse responses following the deleveraging shock under optimal policy in com-
parison with the policy in which both countries follow inflation-targeting policies
piH,t = 2% and pi
∗
F,t = 2%, but can be constrained by the zero-lower bound. Vari-
ables are: Home and Foreign consumption (C ,C∗), Home and Foreign output
(YH , Y
∗
F ), terms of trade (T ), the level of external debt of country H as a percent-
age of its GDP (dgdp). All variables, except for dgdp, are in percentage deviations
from the steady state.
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Figure 14: Impulse responses following the deleveraging shock under optimal policy in
comparison with the policy in which both countries follow inflation-targeting
policies piH,t = 2% and pi
∗
F,t = 2%, but can be constrained by the zero-lower
bound. Variables are: Home and Foreign nominal interest rates (i,i∗), Home
and Foreign producer inflation rates (piH , pi
∗
F ), world inflation (pi
W ), defined as
piW = 1/2 · pi+ 1/2 · pi∗ where pi and pi∗ are the Home and Foreign CPI inflation
rates, the level of the nominal exchange rate (S); inflation and interest rates are
in percents and annual rates.
79
an interesting benchmark of comparison to discuss how optimal policy changes when
there is a deleveraging shock. As previously discussed, it should be noted that the
latter couple of policies is not feasible since at the beginning of deleveraging they
would imply a nominal interest rate for country H, below the zero-lower bound.
Considering such a constraint, the GDP inflation rate in country H needs to fall
under the target, as shown in Figure 14, while the economy stays in the “liquidity
trap” for eight quarters. On the contrary, the zero-lower bound is not a constraint
for country F.
As shown in Figure 13, inflation-targeting policies are quite costly for both economies
in particular in terms of a contraction in output for several quarters. Moreover,
the consumption recession in country H is particularly deep and counteracted only
in part by an expansion in the consumption of Foreign households. The short-run
depreciation of the deleverager’s nominal exchange rate is sizeable and around 9%.
External debt reaches slowly the efficient level after more than fifteen quarters.
As shown in the same figure, optimal policy improves substantially with respect to
inflation-targeting policies. First, it should be noted that country H’s external debt
converges to the new steady state level of 30% of GDP earlier but still after four
years. Even under optimal policy, the contraction of the deleverager’s consumption is
inevitable, although mitigated. There is now a larger increase in the other country’s
consumption. Most important, the output recession is milder in both countries and
also shorter in country H. The better adjustment is achieved with less variations
of the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade. The improvements in the real
economies are explained by the different monetary policies followed under optimal
policy. Interest rate in the deleveraging country should be at the zero-lower bound
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for a longer horizon, up to three years.25 In country F , the interest rate is also
low but remains above the zero-lower bound. The fact that the real interest rates
substantially fall in countries H and F mitigates the costs of deleveraging. The GDP
inflation rates should fluctuate around their target: an increase in foreign inflation
is needed at the beginning of deleveraging while inflation in country H initially falls
below target, and then rises afterward. Interestingly, sub-optimal inflation-targeting
policies even undershoot their inflation targets, in country H, because of the zero-
lower bound constraint. This implies a global disinflation measured by world inflation,
piw. Instead, under optimal policy, world inflation stays above the 2% target, in
particular at the beginning of the deleveraging episode.
The figures show three channels though which the benevolent planner can cope with
a deleveraging shock in country H. First, it can lower the real interest rate in the
deleverager to reduce its borrowing costs, mainly through policies in country H of
low or zero nominal interest rate and inflation above target. Second, it can mitigate
the consumption and output recession in country H by expanding consumption in
country F through a lowering of the real rates in country F , again using policies of
low or zero nominal interest rate and inflation above target in country F. Third, it
can mitigate the output recession in country H through a worsening of the Home
terms of trade and a depreciation of its nominal exchange rate to switch expenditure
from foreign to domestic goods. However, all the identified channels imply costs in
terms of the loss function (2.26) which should be appropriately weighted.
We now turn to investigate how alternative international transmission mechanisms
change the way in which the benevolent planner uses the three channels identified
25The results that under optimal policy the stay at the zero-lower bound is longer than under
inflation targeting is in line with the findings of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) in a simple closed-
economy model.
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above.
2.5. Alternative international transmission mechanisms
How do the results of Figures 13 and 14 change under alternative international trans-
mission mechanisms? We address this question through different assumptions on the
elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign goods, θ, and the degree of home
bias in goods consumption, captured by α.
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Figure 15: Impulse responses under optimal policy for different values of θ = 0.5, 1 and
6. Variables are: Home and Foreign consumption (C ,C∗), Home and Foreign
output (YH , Y
∗
F ), terms of trade (T ), the level of external debt of country H as
a percentage of its GDP (dgdp). All variables, except for dgdp, are in percentage
deviations from the steady state.
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Figure 16: Impulse responses under optimal policy for different values of θ = 0.5, 1 and
6. Variables are: Home and Foreign nominal interest rates (i,i∗), Home and
Foreign producer inflation rates (piH , pi
∗
F ), world inflation (pi
W ), defined as piW =
1/2 · pi + 1/2 · pi∗ where pi and pi∗ are the Home and Foreign CPI inflation rates,
the level of the nominal exchange rate (S); inflation and interest rates are in
percents and annual rates.
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The parameter θ measures the elasticity of substitution of consumption between
Home and Foreign goods with respect to variations in their relative price. When
θ is high, it suffices a small depreciation of the Home currency to create significant
expenditure-switching effects from country F ’s goods to those of country H. The clas-
sical expenditure-switching channel is clearly stronger when the elasticity θ is larger.
However, this is not all that matters for the international transmission mechanism.
It should be noted, indeed, that real income depends critically on the position of θ
with respect to the unitary value. The real income of country H in units of its own
consumption can be written as
PH,tYH t
Pt
=
(
PH,t
Pt
)1−θ [
αCt + (1− α)QθtC∗t
]
from which it follows that values of θ below the unitary value might imply that a
worsening of the Home terms of trade or a depreciation of the Home currency, i.e. a
fall in PH,t/Pt, can have adverse effects on the Home country’s real income making
it harder to deleverage. This reminds phenomena of “immiserizing” growth in which
a depreciation of the currency can increase production of a country but at the same
time make it more poor with a reduction in its real income.
Figures 15 and 16 show how optimal policy changes for alternative values of θ around
the benchmark value of one, namely we plot impulse responses under optimal policy
for θ = 0.5, 1 and 6. Consistently with the previous discussion a value of θ below
one is harmful for the real income of country H. The consumption recession is much
deeper, when θ = 0.5, while the needed expansion in the foreign country is specularly
stronger. Output recession is now deep in the Home country but not in the Foreign
economy because the terms of trade does not vary much. Instead, for a higher θ = 6,
the expenditure-switching channel works to improve the deleverager’s real income and
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can therefore mitigate its consumption recession. A smaller expansion in consumption
is required in the foreign country, but an output recession is now unavoidable because
of the effectiveness of the expenditure-switching effect.
The paths of the terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate deserve particular
attention under the three scenarios. As already discussed, a deleveraging shock under
home bias mechanically produces an initial worsening of the Home-country terms of
trade and of its nominal exchange rate. However, as shown in the objective function
(2.26), these movements are inefficient and the optimal policy should aim to reduce
them by weighing them appropriately with the trade-offs implicit in the loss function.
Indeed, when θ = 6, the expenditure-switching channel is strong enough that a smaller
depreciation of the currency is sufficient to substantially shift production from foreign
to home goods. On the contrary, when θ = 0.5, this channel is weaker and moreover
real income of the deleverager’s country is adversely hit. Even in this case, the optimal
policy requires a smaller short-run depreciation of country H ′s currency and now a
substantial appreciation in the long run.
Interestingly, Figure 16 shows that the stay at the zero-lower bound depends on the
alternative assumptions on θ. For low values of θ, the stay at the zero-lower bound
for country H is exactly five years. Even country F is now forced to stay at the
zero-lower bound and for a long period of two years. This is because the contraction
in country H ′s consumption is larger and requires more expansion in country F ′s
consumption, which can be stimulated by a larger fall in its real interest rate and
therefore in the nominal interest rate. The stay at the zero-lower bound is completely
avoided for higher values of θ where the nominal interest rate of country F stays
above the constraint.
Speaking in terms of the three channels identified above, the expenditure-switching
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channel cannot be used when θ is low. Therefore, the benevolent planner has to rely
more on the real interest-rate channels by lowering more the policy rates. A global
liquidity trap may be optimal in this case. On the contrary when θ is high, the
expenditure-switching channel is more effective, hence there is less need to lower the
real interest rates, in particular in the foreign country. The liquidity trap is shorter
for the deleverager and absent in country F.
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Figure 17: Impulse responses under optimal policy for different values of α = 0.5, 0.76 and
0.95. Variables are: Home and Foreign consumption (C ,C∗), Home and Foreign
output (YH , Y
∗
F ), terms of trade (T ), the level of external debt of country H as
a percentage of its GDP (dgdp). All variables, except for dgdp, are in percentage
deviations from the steady state.
The other dimension through which the international transmission mechanism of the
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Figure 18: Impulse responses under optimal policy for different values of α = 0.5, 0.76
and 0.95. Variables are: Home and Foreign nominal interest rates (i,i∗), Home
and Foreign producer inflation rates (piH , pi
∗
F ), world inflation (pi
W ), defined as
piW = 1/2 · pi+ 1/2 · pi∗ where pi and pi∗ are the Home and Foreign CPI inflation
rates, the level of the nominal exchange rate (S); inflation and interest rates are
in percents and annual rates.
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shock could be different is along alternative assumptions on the degree of home bias,
captured by the parameter α. We have already discussed, in the simple model of
Section 2, that the responses of terms of trade and nominal exchange rate depend
on this assumption. The higher is the home bias, the more the terms of trade of the
deleveraging country worsen implying a nominal exchange rate depreciation. How-
ever, according to (2.26), all these movements are costly and optimal monetary policy
should be directed to mitigate them. Figures 17 and 18, fixing now θ at the benchmark
unitary value, show how optimal policy changes for alternative values of α around the
benchmark of 0.76, plotting also the impulse responses when there is no home bias,
i.e. α = 0.5, and for a high degree of home bias, α = 0.95. As Figure 18 shows, the
nominal exchange rate depreciates only slightly in absence of home bias. However,
there is still an important international transmission of the shock since Home and
Foreign real interest rates are more interconnected in this case.26
The fall in Foreign real rates stimulates consumption in country F to compensate for
the fall in countryH. Not surprisingly, given the fall in both real rates, foreign country
is now forced to stay at the zero-lower bound and for a long time. When instead
the home-bias parameter is large, the two economies behave like closed economies.
Indeed, while the nominal exchange rate moves a lot without much ability to switch
expenditure across goods, consumption and output in the Foreign economy are only
marginally affected by the deleveraging of country H. In this case, the nominal interest
rate in country F does not go to the zero-lower bound while the liquidity trap is longer
in country H. With a high degree of home bias, the large depreciation of the exchange
rate is helpless and the entire burden of adjustment is borne by the deleverager.
In terms of the three channel identified above, the only one available to cope with
26When α = 0.5, the Home and Foreign real interest rates associated with the consumption baskets
C and C∗ are equal across countries, since C = C∗.
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the shock, when α is high, is the fall in the real rate in the deleverager. Indeed, in
this case, the economies are closed. For intermediate values of α, economies become
more open and therefore the other two channels become more relevant. When α is
close to 0.5, the exchange rate is marginally affected by the deleveraging shock and
the benevolent planner lowers the real rates in both countries. A global liquidity trap
emerges in this case.
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Figure 19: First chart: first-quarter level of the nominal exchange rate (S). Second chart:
length of stay (in quarters) at the zero-lower bound for the deleveraging country
H. Third chart: length of stay (in quarters) at the zero-lower bound for country
F. Fourth chart: costs of deleveraging in units of a percentage change in steady-
state consumption for both countries. All charts are done under optimal policy
for different values of θ (x-axis) and for α = 0.5, 0.76 and 0.95.
Figure 19 synthesizes some of the results of this Section by plotting in the following
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order, from top to the bottom, the first-quarter level of the nominal exchange rate,
the length of stay (in quarters) at the zero-lower bound, for the Home and Foreign
country, respectively, and the costs of the deleveraging shock under optimal policy.
All these plots are done for a range of θ between 0.5 and 6 and for three values of
α = 0.5, 0.76 and 0.95.27
The Home-country exchange rate depreciates on impact the more, the higher the
degree of home bias and the closer to the unitary value the elasticity of substitution
is. Higher values of θ or values below one imply a smaller depreciation and even
a short-run appreciation in absence of home bias. The length of the stay at the
zero-lower bound becomes shorter as the elasticity of substitution θ increases. A low
value of α reduces the stay for the deleveraging country at the expenses of a longer
stay for the other economy. Finally, the bottom chart of Figure 19 shows the costs
of deleveraging in terms of a permanent reduction, in percentage, in the steady-state
consumption levels of both countries. The costs are particularly sizeable when the
international transmission mechanism is weaker. In our model, this weakness depends
on two factors: 1) a low elasticity of substitution, since it implies a weak expenditure-
switching channel and may cause phenomena of “immiserizing” growth and 2) a high
degree of home bias, since economies are closed and the shock can only be absorbed
in the Home country.
2.6. Deleveraging and the original sin
In this section, we study how the transmission mechanism of international debt
deleveraging and its efficient adjustment change when the external debt is denomi-
nated in foreign currency. Indeed, the analysis of previous sections might be appro-
27As discussed in Benigno (2009), in a similar class of models, there is no solution for low values
of θ.
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priate for countries like the US which has the exorbitant privilege of being able to
borrow in its own currency, but not for emerging-market economies which are usually
affected by the original sin of borrowing in foreign currency. We make few changes
to our model to accommodate this case. In particular the flow budget constraint of
households in country H is now written as:
PtCt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj + Πt +
StDt
1 + i∗t
− StDt−1 − ftPt · χ˜
(
StDt
Pt
1
ft
,
StD¯t
Pt
1
ft
)
where indeed the currency denomination of debt is that of country F and the interest-
rate paid on debt is the foreign interest rate 1 + i∗t . We have also changed the
arguments of the cost function to reflect the new denomination of debt where now ft
represents the risk-free level of external debt that can be held without costs. Given
this budget constraint, the Euler equations change appropriately. Details are left to
the online appendix.
Figures 20 and 21 compare the results of optimal policy when debt of the deleveraging
country is denominated in foreign currency with the benchmark case of domestically-
denominated debt of Section 2.4.
Results are in some way surprising. The striking difference is in the response of the
policy rates. Under the benchmark case of debt denominated in domestic currency,
the liquidity trap is mainly affecting the deleverager’s nominal interest rate. On the
opposite, when debt is denominated in foreign currency, it is the foreign interest rate
that should be forced to the zero-lower bound and for long time, almost three years as
shown in Figure 21. This is intuitive since the borrowing cost for the deleverager de-
pends now on foreign interest rates. To ease the costs of deleveraging, the benevolent
planner tries to lower at most the foreign interest rate. Indeed, the domestic nominal
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Figure 20: Impulse responses under optimal policy: comparison between the benchmark
case of debt denominated in domestic currency versus the case of foreign-
denominated debt. Variables are: Home and Foreign consumption (C ,C∗),
Home and Foreign output (YH , Y
∗
F ), terms of trade (T ), the level of external
debt of country H as a percentage of its GDP (dgdp). All variables, except for
dgdp, are in percentage deviations from the steady state.
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Figure 21: Impulse responses under optimal policy: comparison between the benchmark
case of debt denominated in domestic currency versus the case of foreign-
denominated debt. Variables are: Home and Foreign nominal interest rates
(i,i∗), Home and Foreign producer inflation rates (piH , pi∗F ), world inflation (pi
W ),
defined as piW = 1/2 ·pi+1/2 ·pi∗ where pi and pi∗ are the Home and Foreign CPI
inflation rates, the level of the nominal exchange rate (S); inflation and interest
rates are in percents and annual rates.
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interest rate is left to rise. The fact that now the foreign interest rate stays longer at
the zero-lower bound implies also that the real rate in country F is lower for a long
period which pushes up consumption in country F to a larger extent. On impact it
rises by 7.5% as opposed to the 4% of the benchmark case. As a consequence, output
expands more in country F .
It is also surprising to see that the exchange rate depreciates much more when debt
is denominated in foreign currency rather than under the benchmark case. Indeed,
a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate is even more costly in this case since
it “inflates” the real resources needed by country H to pay back debt. The overall
external debt to GDP initially rises and then falls at a slower pace toward the new
steady-state value. However, these costs are outweighed by the benefits. The central
planner, by worsening the Home-country terms of trade, can tilt production from
the Foreign economy to the Home country. This is needed to mute the expansion in
the Foreign economy, caused by a too low real rate. Otherwise, the over heating in
country F would be even larger bringing more inefficiencies.
2.7. Conclusion
We have examined the international implications of debt deleveraging in one country
within the world economy and studied how monetary policy should be set at the global
level, focusing in particular on the reaction of the nominal exchange rate and policy
rates. Deleveraging reduces aggregate demand and may lead to recession, as economic
agents save to repay the debt. There are interesting international spillovers through
trade and the exchange rate. The adjustment to a deleveraging shock naturally
requires movements in two relative prices: namely the exchange rate and the real
interest rate. The exchange rate, which is an international relative price, moves
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in such a way as to rebalance resources across countries. The deleveraging country’s
currency will depreciate in the short run and appreciate in the long-run. This depends
critically on home bias in consumers’ preferences. Since in the short run agents who
are paying down their debt have less resources for consumption, the price of home
goods should fall relative to the foreign, and a fall in the exchange rate will assist this
adjustment. Once the debt has been repaid, however, agents have more resources to
spend and in particular on domestic goods. This exchange rate movements produce
expenditure-switching effects which favour production in the deleveraging country
at the expenses of the rest of the world. The other important relative price in the
adjustment, the real interest rate, will come down in both countries and fall more
sharply in the deleveraging country. This fall in the real rates stimulates foreign
consumption in order to mitigate the overall impact of the shock on the deleverager
and the world economy.
The interesting and surprising result of this paper is that all these large variations
in relative prices and quantities are inefficient, when seen from the perspective of a
benevolent planner, who cares about world utility and sees the new level of external
debt reached after deleveraging as the efficient one. This planner dislikes all the
adjustment process described above and would like to immediately achieve the new
equilibrium allocation characterized by lower debt. Therefore, important trade-offs
emerge between stabilizing consumption, output and relative prices. The desirability
of the expenditure-switching channel versus the Home and Foreign real-interest-rate
channels depends on the elasticity of substitution in consumption between domestic
and foreign goods and on the degree of home bias. Only for elasticities of substitution
around the unitary value, the nominal exchange rate of the deleverager is left to
depreciate in a sizeable way in the short run. Otherwise, it should move less or even
95
appreciate when the elasticity of substitution is very low. For low degrees of home
bias, the real interest rate should fall in a substantial way in the foreign economy and
the burden of adjustment is more shared across countries. High degrees of home bias
imply that all the burden is on the deleveraging country because economies are more
closed. It is true that the nominal exchange rate and terms of trade vary substantially
in these cases, but they are less effective in generating spillovers to the rest of the
world.
In this study, we have concentrated on the role of monetary policy and alternative
exchange-rate regimes in mitigating or amplifying the costs of debt deleveraging.
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a significant constraint in our
analysis, because the natural rate of interest falls substantially. We have shown that
whether zero-lower bound policies should be coordinated or not depends also on the
international transmission mechanism. When the elasticity of substitution between
foreign and domestic goods and/or the degree of home bias are low, a global liquidity
trap should emerge as an optimal policy of a benevolent planner.
We have analyzed a very simple two-country open-economy model. The consequent
limitations are essentially the price paid for the simplifications used. First, in the real
world debt deleveraging affects a variety of agents in the economy: households, banks,
firms and governments. Distinguishing them in the model would enhance realism
and possibly enable us to differentiate the effects of deleveraging on the economy
according on which agents are paying down their debt. It is likely that, however,
the qualitative results implied by our simple framework would hold also in a more
complex context. Second, the asset market structure has been kept very simple
– only one asset traded internationally. This is a significant limitation, since the
portfolio position of a country is much more complex and diversified involving assets
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and liabilities, in different currencies and instruments ranging from equity to debt.
Finally, we have focused on the response of a benevolent policymaker maximizing
welfare of the global economy and abstracted from a possible lack of international
monetary policy coordination which might change in a substantial way the equilibrium
allocation. In particular, among the three channels identified in this paper to cope
with the deleveraging shock, the fall in the real rate of the non-deleveraging country
and the depreciation of the nominal exchange rate requires some cooperation at the
international level. Non-coordinated policies might result in sub-optimal equilibria
with higher costs for the world economy. This is an interesting area of analysis which
we leave to future research.28
28Fujiwara et al. (2011) discuss cooperative versus non-cooperative solutions in the emergence of
global liquidity traps.
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APPENDIX
2.8. Derivation of loss function (2.23)
To derive (2.23), we take a second-order approximation around the final steady state
of the following Lagrangian
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ξ ln(Ct) + (1− ξ) ln(C∗t ) + λ1,t(YH,t − (αT 1−αt Ct + (1− α)Tαt C∗t )+
+λ2,t(Y
∗
F,t − ((1− α)T−αt Ct + αTα−1t C∗t ))
}
First it should be noted that in the steady state the following conditions
ξC¯−1 = T¯ 1−αλ¯1, (2.27)
(1− ξ)(C¯∗)−1 = T¯αλ¯1, (2.28)
T¯ λ¯1 = λ¯2, (2.29)
hold together with the two resource constraints.
By taking a second-order approximation of the above Lagrangian around the above-
defined steady state, we obtain
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L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ξC¯−1(Ct − C¯)− ξC¯−2(Ct − C¯)2 + (1− ξ)(C¯∗)−1(C∗t − C¯∗)+
−(1− ξ)(C¯∗)−2(C∗t − C¯∗)2 − λ¯1[α(1− α)C¯T¯−α(Tt − T¯ ) + αT¯ 1−α(Ct − C¯)+
+α(1− α)T¯−α(Tt − T¯ )(Ct − C¯)− α2(1− α)C¯T¯−α−1 (Tt − T¯ )
2
2
+
+α(1− α)C¯∗T¯α−1(Tt − T¯ ) + (1− α)T¯α(C∗t − C¯∗)+
α(1− α)T¯α−1(Tt − T¯ )(C∗t − C¯∗)− α(1− α)2C¯∗T¯α−2
(Tt − T¯ )2
2
]+
−λ¯2[−α(1− α)C¯T¯−α−1(Tt − T¯ ) + (1− α)T¯−α(Ct − C¯)+
−α(1− α)T¯−α−1(Tt − T¯ )(Ct − C¯) + α(1 + α)(1− α)C¯T¯−α−2 (Tt − T¯ )
2
2
+
+α(α− 1)C¯∗T¯α−2(Tt − T¯ ) + αT¯α−1(C∗t − C¯∗) + α(α− 1)T¯α−2(Tt − T¯ )(C∗t − C¯∗)+
+α(α− 1)(α− 2)C¯∗T¯α−3 (Tt − T¯ )
2
2
]
}
in which it should be noted that all the linear terms cancel out using the steady-state
relationship. The second-order terms can be simplified and the above expression
collapses to
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−ξ(C˜t)2 − (1− ξ)(C˜∗t )−2 − λ¯1α(1− α)C¯T¯ 1−α
T˜t
2
2
− λ¯1α(1− α)C¯∗T¯α T˜t
2
2
}
which can be further written as
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
−ξ(C˜t)2 − (1− ξ)(C˜∗t )−2 − α(1− α)ξ
T˜t
2
2
− α(1− α)(1− ξ) T˜t
2
2
}
from which the loss function in the text follows.
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2.9. Model equilibrium conditions
The model of Section 3 is represented by the following 18 equilibrium conditions
(C∗t )
−ρ = βEt
{
(C∗t+1)
−ρ (1 + it)Qt
Qt+1Πt+1
}
,
(C∗t )
−ρ = βEt
{
(C∗t+1)
−ρ (1 + i
∗
t )
Π∗t+1
}
,
(Ct)
−ρ
{
1− (1 + it)ψ
(
dt
kt
)}
= βEt
{
(Ct+1)
−ρ (1 + it)
Πt+1
}
,
Ct = pH,tYH,t +
dt
(1 + it)
− dt−1
Πt
− ktχ
(
dt
kt
)
Y ∗F,t = p
−θ
F,t
[
(1− α)Ct + αQθtC∗t
]
YH,t = p
−θ
H,t
[
αCt + (1− α)QθtC∗t
]
pθ−1F,t = α (Tt)
θ−1 + (1− α)
pθ−1H,t = α + (1− α) (Tt)1−θ1− λ∗
(
Π∗F,t
Π¯∗
)τ−1
1− λ∗

1+ητ
τ−1
=
F ∗t
K∗t
F ∗t = (C
∗
t )
−ρpF,t
1
Qt
Y ∗F,t + βλ
∗Et
[
F ∗t+1
(
Π∗F,t+1
Π¯∗
)τ−1]
K∗t = µ˜(Y
∗
F,t)
1+η + βλ∗Et
[
K∗t+1
(
Π∗F,t+1
Π¯∗
)τ(1+η)]
1− λ
(
ΠH,t
Π¯
)τ−1
1− λ

1+ητ
τ−1
=
Ft
Kt
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Ft = (Ct)
−ρpH,tYH,t + βλEt
[
Ft+1
(
ΠH,t+1
Π¯
)τ−1]
Kt = µ˜Y
1+η
H,t + βλEt
[
Kt+1
(
ΠH,t+1
Π¯
)τ(1+η)]
Tt
Tt−1
=
Π∗F,t
ΠH,t
St
St−1
Qt =
[
(1− α)p1−θH,t + αp1−θF,t
] 1
1−θ
Πt =
[
α (ΠH,t)
1−θ + (1− α) (TtΠH,t)1−θ
] 1
1−θ
[
α + (1− α) (Tt−1)1−θ
] 1
1−θ
Π∗t = Πt
(
Qt
Qt−1
)(
St−1
St
)
which need to be solved for the following 20 unknowns Ct, C
∗
t , it, Qt, Πt, i
∗
t , Π
∗
t , Tt,
YH,t,.YF,t, dt, Π
∗
F,t, F
∗
t , K
∗
t , ΠH,t, Ft, Kt, St/St−1, pH,t, pF,t given the inflation targets Π¯
∗
and Π¯ where two further restrictions come from the policy rules, specified in the text.
Notice that µ˜ is composite mark-up including the mark-ups in the goods and labor
markets, i.e. µ˜ = µ · µw where µw ≡ τ/(τ − 1). We also have defined pH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt
and pF,t ≡ PF,t/Pt. Moreover, the zero-lower-bound constraint requires that it ≥ 0
and i∗t ≥ 0. In the above equations, we have defined χ(dt/kt) = χ˜(dt/k, d¯t/k) since in
equilibrium d¯t = dt.
2.10. Model Solution
We define yt ≡ [zt xt−1 wt] as a vector of length ny containing the control variables,
zt, of dimension nz, the endogenous state variables, xt−1, of dimension nx and the
exogenous state variables, wt, of dimension nw. In particular we may define vector of
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exogenous state variables more specifically, i.e.:
wt ≡
[
kt i
z
t i
∗z
t ct c
∗
t yH,t y
∗
F,t st
]′
where kt represents the safe level of debt, as defined in the main text; i
z
t and i
∗z
t
are two variables used to model the zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rates.
Indeed in the log-linear approximation, the restriction that nominal interest rates
should be above zero corresponds to have ıˆt ≥ izt and ıˆ∗t ≥ i∗zt . The variables ct, c∗t ,
yH,t, y
∗
F,t and st are the defined in equation (2.40) and represent the log deviation
between the final and initial steady state of C, C∗, YH , Y ∗F and T respectively.
Finally we define  as a vector of length n that collects innovations to the exogenous
stochastic variables. Again we may define this vector more in detail:
 ≡
[
(ln(kmin)− ln(kmax)) − ln(Πβ − 1) − ln(Πβ − 1) c c∗ yH y∗F s
]′
where x is defined as the log difference between the final and initial steady state for
a generic variable X, i.e. x ≡ ln(X¯) − ln(X). The process for the exogenous state
variables can be modeled as:
wt = Mwwt−1 + C˜t 
where Mw is an identity matrix of dimensions nw × nw. C˜t is matrix of dimension
nw × n and it is an identity matrix when t = 1, otherwise it is a matrix of zeros.
We can write the model in a compact form as:
A · yt+1 = Bt · yt + Ct+1 ·  (2.30)
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where Bt and Ct+1 are time-dependent matrices, A and Bt have dimension ny × ny
and Ct+1 has dimension ny × n. The matrix Ct is of the form
Ct+1 =
 H
C˜t+1
 ,
where H is a matrix of zeros of dimension (ny − nw)× n.
We consider a framework which is flexible enough to treat the possibility that either
Home interest rate, it, is at zero-lower bound, or Foreign interest rate, i
∗
t , is at zero-
lower bound, or both, or none of them. Bt should be adjusted accordingly depending
on the different cases.
We define Ba as the matrix characterizing the case in which both interest rates are
at zero lower bound; BH(BF ) is the matrix characterizing the case where only Home
(Foreign) interest rate is at zero lower bound while Bn refers to the case where both
interest rates are not constrained by the zero-lower bound.
In the model of Section (2.4), we verify the following sequence of events: from 0 to
T1 both interest rates are at zero lower bound (T1 can also be 0), from T1 to T2 only
the interest rate in country H is at zero lower bound. From T2 onwards both interest
rates are above zero. This timing implies that:
Bt =

Ba for t ∈ (0;T1]
BH for t ∈ (T1, T2]
Bn for t ∈ (T2,∞]
where T1 and T2 are model specific and to be determined endogenously.
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In the model of Section (2.6), we verify the following sequence of events: from 0 to
T˜1, the interest rate in country F is at the zero lower bound and, from T˜1 onwards,
both interest rates will be above zero.
This timing implies that:
Bt =

BF for t ∈ (0, T˜1]
Bn for t ∈ (T˜1,∞]
We can rewrite the system (2.30) by omitting the law of motion of the exogenous
state variables:
[
A˜1 A˜2
]zt+1
xt
 = [B˜t1 B˜t2 B˜t3]

zt
xt−1
wt
 (2.31)
where A˜ is a matrix of dimension (ny − nw) × (ny − nw) which is appropriately
partitioned in the matrices A˜1 and A˜2, while B˜ is a matrix of dimension (ny−nw)×ny
which is appropriately partitioned in the matrices B˜t1, B˜
t
2, B˜
t
3.
We guess the following linear solution:
zt = h
t
xxt−1 + h
t
wwt−1 + h
t
,
xt = g
t
xxt−1 + g
t
wwt−1 + g
t
,
wt = Mwwt−1 + C˜t,
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We can plug the guessed solution into equation (2.31) and rearrange everything to
get: [
A˜1h
t+1
x + A˜2 −B˜t1
]gtx
htx
 = B˜t2 (2.32)
[
A˜1h
t+1
x + A˜2 −B˜t1
]gtw
htw
 = B˜t3Mw − A˜1ht+1w Mw (2.33)
[
A˜1h
t+1
x + A˜2 −B˜t1
]gt
ht
 = B˜t3C˜t − A˜1ht+1 − A˜1ht+1w C˜t (2.34)
Equations (2.32), (2.33) and (2.34) can be solved for the unknown matrices htx, h
t
w,
ht, g
t
x, g
t
w, g
t
 working backward. Since we know that after T2 (or T˜1 in the model
with foregn-denominated debt), there are no shocks and the interest rates are not
constrained by the zero-lower bound, we can find the unknown time-invariant matrices
hx, hw, h, gx, gw, g which applies for each t ≥ T2 (or t ≥ T1). Then starting from
these matrices, we can get all the remaining matrices by using the above equations
working backward. Given an initial guess on T1, T2 for one model and T˜1 for the
other model, we verify that the implied path of the nominal interest rates and the
stay at the zero-lower bound are consistent with the guessed timing. Otherwise, we
guess another T1, T2 or T˜1, depending on the model.
2.11. Optimal policy
We take a second-order approximation of the welfare of world economy (2.25) around
the final efficient steady state. First, notice that the objective can be written as
Ut = Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ξ
(
C1−ρt
1− ρ −
Y 1+ηH,t
1 + η
∆t
)
+ (1− ξ)
(
C∗1−ρt
1− ρ −
Y ∗1+ηF,t
1 + η
∆∗t
)]}
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where the indexes of price dispersion are defined as
∆t ≡ λ
(
ΠH,t
Π¯t
)(1+η)τ
∆t−1 + (1− λ)
1− λ
(
ΠH,t
Π¯t
)τ−1
1− λ

(1+η)τ
τ−1
(2.35)
∆∗t ≡ λ∗
(
ΠF,t
Π¯∗t
)(1+η)τ
∆∗t−1 + (1− λ∗)
1− λ∗
(
ΠF,t
Π¯∗t
)τ−1
1− λ∗

(1+η)τ
τ−1
. (2.36)
A second-order approximation of the objective function around the efficient steady
state delivers
Ut = U¯ + Et
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt[ξ[C¯−ρ(Ct − C¯)− Y¯ ηH(YH,t − Y¯H)− (1 + η)−1Y¯ 1+ηH (∆t − 1)+
1
2
C¯−ρ−1(Ct − C¯)2 − 1
2
Y¯ η−1H (YH,t − Y¯H)2] + (1− ξ)[C¯∗−ρ(C∗t − C¯∗)+
−Y¯ ∗ηF (Y ∗F,t − Y¯ ∗F )− (1 + η)−1Y¯ ∗1+ηF (∆∗t − 1) +
1
2
C¯∗−ρ−1(C∗t − C¯∗)2+
−1
2
Y¯ ∗η−1F (Y
∗
F,t − Y¯ ∗F )2]] +O(‖ · ‖3)
where O(‖ · ‖3) contains terms of order higher than the second. We take a second-
order approximation of the constraints
Y ∗F,t = p
−θ
F,t
[
(1− α)Ct + αQθtC∗t
]
,
YH,t = p
−θ
H,t
[
αCt + (1− α)QθtC∗t
]
,
considering that
αp1−θH,t + (1− α)p1−θF,t = 1,
Q1−θt = (1− α)p1−θH,t + αp1−θF,t .
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where, consistently with Appendix B, we define pH,t ≡ PH,t/Pt and pF,t ≡ PF,t/Pt.
Combining the second-order approximation of the constraints with the second-order
approximation of the utility function at the efficient steady state, we can obtain after
some steps that
Ut = U¯ + ξC¯
1−ρEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−ρC˜
2
t
2
− ρC¯
∗Q¯
C¯
C˜∗2t
2
− η p¯H Y¯H
C¯
Y˜ 2H,t
2
− η p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
Y˜ ∗2F,t
2
−θ p¯H Y¯H
C¯
p˜2H,t
2
− θ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
p˜2F,t
2
+ θ
C¯∗Q¯
C¯
Q˜2t
2
−(1 + η)−1 p¯H Y¯H
C¯
(∆t − 1)− (1 + η)−1 p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(∆∗t − 1)
]
+O(‖ · ‖3) (2.37)
where we have transformed variables using the following relationship
Xt = X¯
(
1 + X˜t +
1
2
X˜2t
)
+O(‖ · ‖3)
for a generic variable X where X˜ denotes its log-deviation with respect to the final
steady state. Notice that ∆t and ∆
∗
t in (2.37) are second-order terms which can
be expressed in terms of the inflation rates by expanding through a second-order
approximation (2.35) and (2.36). Using these approximations we can write (2.37) as
Ut = U¯ + ξC¯
1−ρEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−ρC˜
2
t
2
− ρC¯
∗Q¯
C¯
C˜∗2t
2
− η p¯H Y¯H
C¯
Y˜ 2H,t
2
− η p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
Y˜ ∗2F,t
2
−θ p¯H Y¯H
C¯
p˜2H,t
2
− θ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
p˜2F,t
2
+ θ
C¯∗Q¯
C¯
Q˜2t
2
−κp¯H Y¯H
C¯
(piH,t − p¯i)2
2
− κ∗ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)2
2
]
+O(‖ · ‖3) (2.38)
where
κ ≡ λτ(1 + ητ)
(1− λ)(1− λβ) , κ
∗ ≡ λ
∗τ(1 + ητ)
(1− λ∗)(1− λ∗β) ,
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and piH,t ≡ ln ΠH,t, pi∗F,t ≡ ln Π∗F,t, p¯i ≡ ln Π¯ and p¯i∗ ≡ ln Π¯∗.
The objective (2.38) can be written also in the equivalent form
Ut = U¯ + ξC¯
1−ρEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−ρ(Cˆt − c)
2
2
− ρC¯
∗Q¯
C¯
(Cˆ∗t − c∗)2
2
− η p¯H Y¯H
C¯
(YˆH,t − yH)2
2
−η p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(Yˆ ∗F,t − y∗F )2
2
− θ p¯H Y¯H
C¯
(pˆH,t − pH)2
2
− θ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(pˆF,t − pF )2
2
+ θ
C¯∗Q¯
C¯
(Qˆt −Q)2
2
−κp¯H Y¯H
C¯
(piH,t − p¯i)2
2
− κ∗ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)2
2
]
+O(‖ · ‖3) (2.39)
where for a generic variable X, Xˆ denotes the log deviations with respect to the initial
steady-state (before deleveraging) and x denotes the log difference between the final
and initial steady state.
The objective function is now quadratic and can be appropriately evaluated by a
log-linear approximation of the constraints around the initial steady state. By taking
an approximation of the model equilibrium conditions presented in the above section
of the Appendix, we respectively get
EtCˆ
∗
t+1 = Cˆ
∗
t + ρ
−1 [ˆıt − Et(pit+1 − p¯i + Qˆt+1 − Qˆt)]
EtCˆ
∗
t+1 = Cˆ
∗
t + ρ
−1 [ˆı∗t − Et(pi∗t+1 − p¯i∗)]
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt + ρ
−1 [ˆıt − Et(pit+1 − p¯i) +$1(dˆt − kˆt)]
Cˆt = υ1[pˆH,t + YˆH,t]− υ2[βıˆt − (pit − p¯i)] + υ2βdˆt − υ2dˆt−1 −$2(dˆt − kˆt)
Yˆ ∗F,t = −θpˆF,t + υ3Cˆt + (1− υ3)(Cˆ∗t + θQˆt)
YˆH,t = −θpˆH,t + υ4Cˆt + (1− υ4)(Cˆ∗t + θQˆt)
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pˆH,t = −(1− α)p1−θF Tˆt
pˆF,t = αp
1−θ
H Tˆt
piH,t − p¯i = φ[ηYˆH,t + ρCˆt − pˆH,t] + βEt(piH,t+1 − p¯i)
pi∗F,t − p¯i∗ = φ∗[ηYˆ ∗F,t + ρCˆ∗t − pˆF,t + Qˆt] + βEt
(
pi∗F,t+1 − p¯i∗
)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + (pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)− (piH,t − p¯i) + ∆Sˆt
Qˆt = (1− α)p1−θH Qθ−1pˆH,t + αp1−θF Qθ−1pˆF,t
= p1−θH p
1−θ
F Q
θ−1(2α− 1)Tˆt
pit − p¯i = αp1−θH (piH,t − p¯i) + (1− α)p1−θF [(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗) + ∆Sˆt]
pi∗t − p¯i = pit − p¯i + ∆Qˆt −∆Sˆt
where φ ≡ τ/κ, φ∗ ≡ τ/κ∗ while these parameters are evaluated at the initial steady-
state
υ1 =
pHYH
C
υ2 =
k
ΠC
υ3 =
(1− α)C
(1− α)C + αC∗Qθ
υ4 =
αC
αC + (1− α)C∗Qθ
$1 ≡ (1 + i)ψd(1)k
$2 ≡ χd(1)
C
.
where we define ψd(1) and χd(.) as the partial derivatives of χ(dt/kt) and ψ(dt/kt)
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with respect to d.29
Note that under the assumption $1 = $2/βυ2 we can re-write the Euler equation
and the budget constraint of the Home country in the following ways
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt + ρ
−1 [ˆıbt − Et(pit+1 − p¯i)]
Cˆt = υ1[pˆH,t + YˆH,t]− υ2[βıˆbt − (pit − p¯i)] + υ2βdˆt − υ2dˆt−1
where the effective borrowing rate ıˆbt is defined as
ıˆbt − ıˆt =
$2
βυ2
(dˆt − kˆt) = $1(dˆt − kˆt).
We maintain this assumption when calibrating the model, as explained in the text.
Optimal policy solves the maximization of (2.39) under the above-defined constraints,
taking into account the two zero-lower-bound constraints. The equilibrium conditions
of the optimal policy problem can be written in the general form (2.30) and therefore
similar steps to those described in that section are used to solve for the response of
the endogenous variables to the deleveraging shocks.
Note that by using the above restrictions, we can further write the second-order
approximation of the utility as
Ut = U¯ + ξC¯
1−ρEt
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
−ρ(Cˆt − c)
2
2
− ρC¯
∗Q¯
C¯
(Cˆ∗t − c∗)2
2
− η p¯H Y¯H
C¯
(YˆH,t − yH)2
2
−η p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(Yˆ ∗F,t − y∗F )2
2
− θp¯1−θH p¯1−θF α(1− α)
(
1 +
C¯∗Q¯
C¯
1
Q¯2(1−θ)
)
(Tˆt − s)2
2
−κp¯H Y¯H
C¯
(piH,t − p¯i)2
2
− κ∗ p¯F Y¯
∗
F
C¯
(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)2
2
]
+O(‖ · ‖3) (2.40)
29The function χ (dt/kt) has been defined in Appendix B.
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2.12. Model with deleveraging on foreign debt
In this section, we discuss the extension of the model to the case in which debt of
the deleveraging country is denominated in foreign currency. In this case, the flow
budget can be written as
PtCt =
∫ 1
0
Wt(j)Lt(j)dj+ Πt +
StDt
1 + i∗t
−StDt−1− ftPt · χ˜
(
StDt
Pt
1
ft
,
StD¯t
Pt
1
ft
)
(2.41)
where now the function capturing the adjustment costs of changing the debt position
has arguments expressed in terms of individual and aggregate real debt, in units of
the domestic price index, with respect to a threshold ft.
The following equilibrium conditions characterize now the consumers’ problems in
the Home country:
(Ct)
−ρ
{
1− (1 + i∗t )ψ
(
d∗t
ft
)}
= β(1 + i∗t )Et
{
(Ct+1)
−ρ Pt
Pt+1
St+1
St
}
,
Ct =
PH,tYH,t
Pt
+
d∗t
(1 + i∗t )
− d
∗
t−1
Πt
St
St−1
− ftχ
(
d∗t
ft
)
where we have defined d∗t = StDt/Pt and
(Ct)
−ρ = βEt
{
(Ct+1)
−ρ (1 + it)
Πt+1
}
,
since we are allowing for trading, within country H, of a risk-less bond denominated
in domestic currency.
Note that in the final steady state now
C¯ = p¯H Y¯H − (1− β)Π¯∗−1f¯ ,
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Q¯C¯∗ = p¯F Y¯ ∗F + (1− β)Π¯∗−1f¯ ,
Finally the model equilibrium conditions in a first-order approximation are now
EtCˆ
∗
t+1 = Cˆ
∗
t + ρ
−1 [ˆı∗t − Et(pi∗t+1 − p¯i∗)]
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt + ρ
−1 [ˆıt − Et(pit+1 − p¯it)]
EtCˆt+1 = Cˆt + ρ
−1 [ˆı∗t − Et(pit+1 − p¯i) + Et∆Sˆt+1 + $˜1(dˆ∗t − fˆt)]
Cˆt = υ1[pˆH,t + YˆH,t]− υ˜2[βıˆ∗t − (pit − p¯i) + ∆Sˆt] + υ˜2βdˆ∗t − υ˜2dˆ∗t−1 − $˜2(dˆ∗t − fˆt)
Yˆ ∗F,t = −θpˆF,t + υ3Cˆt + (1− υ3)(Cˆ∗t + θQˆt)
YˆH,t = −θpˆH,t + υ4Cˆt + (1− υ4)(Cˆ∗t + θQˆt)
pˆH,t = −(1− α)p1−θF Tˆt
pˆF,t = αp
1−θ
H Tˆt
piH,t − p¯i = φ[ηYˆH,t + ρCˆt − pˆH,t] + βEt(piH,t+1 − p¯i)
pi∗F,t − p¯i∗ = φ∗[ηYˆ ∗F,t + ρCˆ∗t − pˆF,t + Qˆt] + βEt
(
pi∗F,t+1 − p¯i∗
)
Tˆt = Tˆt−1 + (pi∗F,t − p¯i∗)− (piH,t − p¯i) + ∆Sˆt
Qˆt = (1− α)p1−θH Qθ−1pˆH,t + αp1−θF Qθ−1pˆF,t
= p1−θH p
1−θ
F Q
θ−1(2α− 1)Tˆt
pit − p¯i = αp1−θH (piH,t − p¯i) + (1− α)p1−θF [(pi∗F,t − p¯i∗) + ∆Sˆt]
pi∗t − p¯i = pit − p¯i + ∆Qˆt −∆Sˆt
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where now
υ˜2 =
f
Π∗C
$˜1 ≡ (1 + i∗)ψd∗(1)f
$˜2 ≡ χd∗(1)f/C.
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